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One should always subordinate his own personal views, whether they be 
economic, social, political, or whatever they may be, because when you 
are talking about your own views you are only one of millions of individu-
als in the country. When you are interpreting the law, perhaps you have 
a special skill and special training that does give you the right to pass 
on these questions. I have to confess that in this open area, sometimes 
inevitably, a man is the product of his own background, and he may be 
somewhat influenced. But I will do my very best to subordinate those con-
siderations because I think that is the duty of any judge.
 — Justice John Stevens, in his Senate confirmation hearing
It is a commonplace, in the press and popular discussions, to characterize the 
Supreme Court in terms of the ideological divisions among its members. In the Roberts 
2006–2009 court, for example, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito are typically thought of as the Court’s conservative wing, while Justices 
Kennedy and O’Connor are depicted as moderates, and Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, 
and Breyer as part of the Court’s liberal wing.
This ideological characterization of the court can be a useful starting point in ana-
lyzing the behavior of Supreme Court justices. But a purely ideological account is 
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incomplete at best. Judging entails deciding what was decided; it requires understand-
ing the case under consideration, understanding the body of the law, and interpret-
ing the meaning of the law as it applies to the case. As Justice Ruth Ginsburg put it, 
“[E]ach case is based on particular facts and its decision should turn on those facts and 
the governing law, stated and explained in light of the particular arguments the parties 
or their representatives choose to present.’’1 This particular decision-making process 
is the reason why the qualifications of candidates to the Supreme Court receive close 
scrutiny in the press, and why the competence of candidates is a significant factor 
explaining whether senators vote to confirm a nominee (Segal, Cameron, and Cover 
1990; Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992; Epstein et al. 2006). Qualifications matter 
because the decision-making process in the court is not only ideological.2
In this paper, we build on the existing literature to incorporate the value of infor-
mation into the purely ideological framework of the spatial model. We provide an 
analysis of decision-making in the court taking into account not only the possible 
bias or ideology of justices, but also the information available to the justices in each 
case, as well as their ability—or skill, as Justice Stevens puts it—to map the law 
and the specifics of the case to an outcome. In this context, we ask: does the case 
information have enough power to overturn the prior biases and ideological consid-
erations of the justices? Our analysis allows us to quantify precisely the degree to 
which justices “subordinated’’ their personal views and “interpreted’’ the law.
To tackle this question, we consider a model in which ideology interacts with 
common values in an incomplete information context.3 We then estimate the param-
eters of the model from Supreme Court voting outcomes. In order to do this, we 
introduce a new estimation approach that allows us to handle our model of voting 
with common values and strategic agents.
In the model, we assume that the goal of any justice i in any given case t is that 
she (in the expressive voting model) or the court (in the strategic voting model) rules 
according to i ’s own best understanding of how the law applies to the particulars of 
the case. We maintain that it is the residual uncertainty in the meaning of the law 
which allows justices to differ in their opinions about a case. With anything less 
than complete certainty, opinions can differ among justices because of idiosyncratic 
thresholds of proof brought by ideological differences, because of differences in the 
information that is effectively available to each justice, or because of differences in 
the ability to evaluate the available information in different contexts.
In particular, we assume that before ruling in each case t, each justice observes a 
private signal, which reflects her understanding of the particulars of the case. The 
precision ( θ it ) of each justice’s signal measures her ability to map the specifics of 
the case to the meaning of the law. The imprecision in the information leaves room 
for interpretation, which in turn allows ideological biases to come into play. These 
biases could reflect variation across a liberal/conservative dimension, theoretical 
arguments about the law, or other determinants for a nonneutral approach to this 
case. In the model, this bias or ideology boils down to a threshold  π it such that the 
1 From the statement submitted to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary by Justice Ruth Ginsburg.
2 See also Cameron and Kornhauser (2008) and Lax and Cameron (2007).
3 Such models of voting have been proposed in the information aggregation literature on voting. See, for exam-
ple, Austen-Smith and Banks (1996); Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997); and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998). 
Our model is closest to Duggan and Martinelli (2001).
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justice prefers to rule for the Plaintiff in this case if and only if the probability that 
the law favors the Plaintiff is at least  π it .4 Information precision and bias then inter-
act to produce outcomes. Higher precision means that it is typically more clear for 
the justice whether the ruling should favor the Plaintiff or the Defendant according 
to the body of law. A larger bias means that despite her case information, a justice 
persists in going with her preconception of how to rule in a case like this. In the 
extreme, with  π it ≈ 0 (or  π it ≈ 1), justice i will vote almost completely in line with 
her ideology. On the other hand, when  π it = 1/2 for all i, the setting boils down to an 
unbiased, pure common values model.
In the estimation, we recover the values of ( θ it ,  π it ) |  X t for each justice i condition-
ing on observable covariates  X t of the cases and the justices. Thus, justices’ bias 
and information precision vary with the type of issue, characteristics of the Plaintiff 
and the Defendant, and other case characteristics, as well with their own judicial 
experience, court experience, and other individual characteristics of each justice. 
We estimate the model in two steps. In the first step, using the observed votes, we 
estimate a “reduced-form’’ model of justices’ probabilities of voting in favor of the 
Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. In 
the second step, we recover the structural parameters characterizing justices’ pref-
erences and information {( θ it ,  π it ) } i=1 n |  X t , using the equilibrium conditions in the 
voting model. We do this for both the expressive voting model (where justices care 
about getting their decision right) and the strategic voting model, where justices are 
concerned about getting the court’s decision right and therefore “learn’’ from their 
peers in equilibrium.
Our approach allows us to disentangle the effects of ideology and information for 
each justice and therefore to quantify the trade-offs between ideology and information 
in the court. The main result of the paper is a measure of the value of information in 
the court. Our measure, FLEX, is the probability that a justice i votes differently than 
what he or she would have voted for in the absence of case-specific information.
The results suggest a sizable value of information in the court: in roughly 44 per-
cent of cases, justices’ initial leanings—which reflect their priors or their ideologi-
cal biases—are changed by the case-specific private information of the justices. 
Moreover, the temporal evolution of FLEX scores suggest that the increased politi-
cization of the Supreme Court appointment process pointed out by the literature 
has become uniformly marked only in the last quarter century, following the failed 
nomination of justice Bork (i.e., within the Rehnquist and Roberts courts). Indeed, 
for Economics and Federalism cases, FLEX scores have fallen about 40 percent 
from the Warren to the Roberts courts, but for basic rights and criminal issues we see 
a marked decrease in FLEX scores (of about 20 percent and 16 percent respectively) 
only during the Rehnquist and Roberts courts.
In other results, we compare the value of information across individual justices 
and issues. We show that justices with the lowest FLEX scores tend to have a liberal 
judicial philosophy, while justices with the highest FLEX scores are not necessar-
ily conservative and include a more than proportional share of chief justices. We 
also show that the value of information in the court is lower in issue areas in which 
4 We write  π it and  θ it instead of simply  π i ,  θ i because in the estimation we allow these parameters to change with 
the characteristics of each case  X t .
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ideological considerations tend to weigh more heavily—such as basic rights. We 
also consider whether justices are differently predisposed when the government is 
involved in a case (they are), and when the court considers the constitutionality of a 
law enacted by Congress (they are, in basic rights cases).
Finally, we use counterfactual simulations to draw implications for institutional 
design. In particular, we compare the performance of the court with a counterfactual 
scenario in which ruling against the Defendant requires the unanimous consent of 
the justices. In a small committee composed of a heterogeneous group of individuals 
in terms of both preferences and abilities, such as the court, majority rule does not 
generically dominate unanimity rule. The results for the court, however, are in line 
with the asymptotic results first pointed out by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) 
(see also Duggan and Martinelli 2001 and Meirowitz 2002), that unanimity rule 
leads to a larger probability of error than simple majority rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the relation with the 
literature. Section II introduces the theoretical model. Section III describes the data, 
and Section IV describes the estimation procedure. Section V discusses the results. 
Section VI concludes.
I. Related Literature
This paper builds on the significant contributions of a large literature. A first group 
of papers uses justices’ voting data—the proportion of votes in favor and against 
the Defendant, or the proportion of liberal and conservative votes—to test various 
hypotheses in reduced form models. Segal and Cover (1989) show that the ideology 
of each justice—as measured by the proportion of liberal and conservative state-
ments in newspaper editorials—is highly correlated with the votes of justices in civil 
liberties cases. Segal et al. (1995) expands the coverage of the original Segal-Cover 
(SC) scores and shows that the correlation is lower for other justices and other issues 
(economic regulation). Epstein and Mershon (1996) further argue that newspaper 
editorials are tilted towards a few “splashy’’ civil liberties issues and show that the 
scores have little explanatory power for most non–civil liberty areas. Epstein et al. 
(1998) argue that the preferences of justices—as measured by the proportion of 
liberal votes on civil liberties cases—changes through time.5 Finally, Landes and 
Posner (2008) argue that members of a liberal or conservative minority do not tend 
to vote more often with the majority the larger the majority is. They also show that 
justices appointed by Democratic presidents (but not those appointed by Republican 
presidents) vote more liberally the fewer of them there are.
The first group of papers measures the ideological preferences of justices with the 
proportion of liberal statements in newspaper editorials or directly with the propor-
tion of liberal votes by each justice. A second group of papers employs a radically 
different approach to recover the ideology of the justices from the data. Martin and 
Quinn (2002) and Martin and Quinn (2007) build on the influential literature analyz-
ing voting records in legislatures (Poole and Rosenthal 1985; Poole and Rosenthal 
1991; Heckman and Snyder 1997; and Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004). The 
5 See also Segal and Spaeth (1993) and Epstein and Knight (1997).
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main idea here is to assume that the voting data is generated by a precise model of 
behavior—the sincere spatial voting model (SVM) commonly employed in political 
science—and then estimate the parameters of the model from the voting data (i.e., 
structural estimation). Building on the findings of Epstein et al. (1998), Martin and 
Quinn also allow ideal policies to change flexibly through time, but the underlying 
theoretical model is otherwise the same as in the above papers.6, 7
For all its attractive properties, the sincere spatial voting model (SVM) has one 
severe limitation when applied to the analysis of voting in the Court: it is a pure 
private values model in which ideology is the only determinant of voting behavior. 
This precludes the possibility of common values and dispersed information which, 
as we argued above, seem central to the nature of decision-making in the court. In 
this paper, we therefore structurally estimate a model that allows both ideology and 
precision of private information to come into play. With common values and dis-
persed information, strategic considerations—which are absent in the sincere voting 
spatial model—come into play.8, 9
In this article we introduce a new estimation procedure to deal with ideology and 
common values in the context of equilibrium behavior. The closest effort is that 
of Iaryczower, Katz, and Saiegh (2009), who model strategic voting and common 
values in Congress.10 The underlying theoretical model in that paper, however, is 
designed to deal with the bicameral aspect of Congress and is otherwise less flexible 
than the model we consider here.
II. The Model
The court is composed of n justices, i = 1, … , n, who consider T independent 
cases, t = 1, … , T. In each case t, justice i can rule in favor or against the Defendant. 
We denote this ruling by  v i t ∈ {0, 1}, with  v i t = 0 indicating a ruling in favor of 
the Defendant and  v i t = 1 a ruling in favor of the Plaintiff. The court aggregates 
the decisions of the individual justices by simple majority rule; i.e., rules in favor of 
the Plaintiff ( v t = 1) if  ∑ i   v i t ≥  R s ≡ (n + 1)/2 and in favor of the Defendant ( v t = 0 ) otherwise.
We consider two related models of individual behavior. In the expressive or sin-
cere voting model, we assume that in deciding their vote, justices care only about 
6 More recently, Degan and Merlo (2009) and Merlo and de Paula (2009) consider the nonparametric identifica-
tion and estimation of the ideological voting model. Coate and Conlin (2004); Coate, Conlin, and Moro (2008); and 
Kawai and Watanabe (2009) also perform structural estimation of strategic voting (i.e., “pivotal voting’’) models, 
with ideological voters.
7 See Lim (2008) for structural estimation of a model that incorporates career concerns into judges’ behavior.
8 See, however, Londregan (1999); Clinton and Meirowitz (2003); and Clinton and Meirowitz (2004), who ana-
lyze the spatial voting model without assuming sincere voting, paying attention to agendas and sequence.
9 It should be emphasized that we are referring here to strategic considerations that are internal to the Court. 
Justices may also be strategic in response to the behavior of political actors outside of the Court (the president, 
Congress). Whether Justices indeed respond or not to these outside pressures is a matter of debate in the literature, 
captured in the “attitudinal” versus “rational choice” camps (see Segal and Spaeth 1993; Gely and Spiller 1990; 
and Spiller and Gely 1992). Clearly, however, for all the rationality in our model, this paper is not any more in the 
“rational choice” than in the “attitudinal” camps. Also see Cameron, Segal, and Songer (2000); and Daughety and 
Reinganum (2006) for strategic models of incomplete information explaining how appellate judges may influence 
the cases that the SC chooses to hear.
10 In Knight and Chiang (2008), common values enter a nonstrategic model in which voters gain information 
about candidates from newspaper endorsements.
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their individual vote. In the strategic or outcome-oriented voting model, we assume 
instead that justices care about the ruling of the court. We assume that the goal of 
any justice i in any given case t is that she (in the expressive voting model) or the 
court (in the strategic voting model) rules according to i ’s own best understanding 
of how the law applies to the particulars of the case.
Specifically, before ruling in each case t, each justice i observes a private signal 
s it =  ω t +  σ it  ε t , where  ε t ∼  (0, 1). Here  ω t ∈ {0, 1} in an unobservable variable—
for both the econometrician and the justices—indicating whether the meaning of the 
law favors the Plaintiff ( ω t = 1) or the Defendant ( ω t = 0), and  θ it = 1/ σ it is a scale 
parameter that parameterizes the informativeness of i ’s signals. This parameteriza-
tion of the information structure satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property 
(MLRP), which is important in what follows.
Justices care about this information because their payoffs are state dependent. In 
particular, we assume that given  π it ∈ (0, 1), justice i has a payoff of − π it when the 
law favors the Defendant but she/the court rules in favor of the Plaintiff ( v t = 1 when ω t = 0) and of −(1 −  π it ) when the law favors the Plaintiff but instead she/the court 
rules in favor of the Defendant ( v t = 0 when  ω t = 1). The payoffs of  v t =  ω t = 0 
and  v t =  ω t = 1 are normalized to zero. Thus, given information E, justice i votes to 
rule against the Defendant in t if and only if P r   i( ω t = 1 | E) ≥  π it . Equivalently, jus-
tice i votes to rule against the Defendant in case t given E if and only if the likelihood 
ratio P r   i(E |  ω t = 1)/P r   i(E |  ω t = 0) is larger than ( π it /(1 −  π it ))((1 −  ρ t )/ ρ t ), 
where  ρ t ≡ Pr( ω t = 1) denotes justices’ common prior probability of the unobserved 
state  ω t . Because  ω t is assumed to be unobservable, there is always information that 
would make any two justices disagree about a case. Moreover, if sufficiently biased, 
two justices can disagree almost always.
In particular, with  π it ≈ 0 (or  π it ≈ 1), justice i is almost always ideological. On 
the other hand, when  π it = 1/2 for all i, the setting boils down to an unbiased, pure 
common values model.11
The two alternative models of behavior differ in how much information each jus-
tice has in equilibrium. In the expressive voting model, justices care about their own 
ruling and therefore vote based on their own information  s it , i.e., rule against the 
Defendant whenever P r   i( ω t = P |  s it ) ≥  π it . Then E consists only of  s it , and i votes 
to rule against the Defendant if
(1)   Pr( s it |  ω t = 1)  __
Pr( s it |  ω t = 0)  =  
ϕ( θ it [ s it − 1])  __ϕ( θ it  s it )  ≥  
 π it  _ 
1 −  π it    
1 −  ρ t  _ ρ t   .
Let  s it exp denote the value of  s it that solves equation (1) with equality. By the MLRP 
the ratio L(s) ≡ Pr(s |  ω t = 1)/Pr(s |  ω t = 0) is increasing in s, so that i rules against 
the Defendant whenever  s it ≥  s it exp and in favor of the Defendant otherwise. This 
cutoff point  s it exp completely characterizes behavior in the expressive voting case. 
11 In our model, ideological differences between justices enter only through the π parameters, and not through 
the prior beliefs ρ, which are assumed to be common across all justices. (This is standard in the literature. However, 
see Froeb and Kobayashi 1996 for a theoretical model where justices’ biases are manifested in their heterogeneous 
priors.) Moreover, our attempt to estimate a model where priors ρ, as well as bias π, differed across justices i and 
cases t resulted in poorly behaved estimates. See footnote 18 below for an explanation.
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Therefore, we can write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t in the expres-
sive voting model as
(2)  Pr ( v t ) ≡  ∑  ω t  
 




 [ 1 − Φ( θ it [  s it exp −  ω t ]) ]  v it  Φ( θ it [  s it exp −  ω t ] ) 1− v it  .
In the strategic voting model, justices care about the decision of the court. As a 
result, any justice i then considers the implications of her vote assuming that she is 
pivotal for the decision. (This supposition is not correct when the justice is not in 
fact pivotal, but for the same reason these mistakes have no cost for the outcome-
oriented justice.) Here, the relevant information for justice i in case t is not only her 
private information  s it , but also the equilibrium information contained in the event 
that i is pivotal for the court’s decision, given the equilibrium strategy profile fol-
lowed by the remaining justices.
Let  μ jt : R → [0, 1] denote the strategy of justice j, where  μ jt ( s jt ) ≡ Pr( v jt = 1 |  s jt ). 
Then (1) becomes
(3)    P  μ −i, t  ( pi v it |  ω t = 1)  __ P  μ −i, t  ( pi v it |  ω t = 0)   
ϕ( θ it [ s it − 1])  __ϕ( θ it  s it )  ≥  
 π it  _ 
1 −  π it   
1 −  ρ t  _ ρ t   .
As before, the MLRP implies that the best response to any strategy  μ −i of the 
remaining justices is a cutoff strategy, such that i rules against the Defendant ( μ it ( s it ) = 1) if  s it implies (3), and in favor of the Defendant ( μ it ( s it ) = 0) other-
wise.12 This, in turn, implies that all responsive equilibria are cutoff equilibria; i.e., 
that any equilibrium is characterized by cutpoints  s it * for each justice i = 1, … , n 
such that justice i votes against the Defendant if and only if  s it ≥  s it *. Now, given cut-
off strategies, Pr( v it = 1 |  ω t ) =  ∫    μ it (s) ϕ( θ it [s −  ω t ]) ds = [1 − Φ( θ it [ s it * −  ω t ])]. 
Therefore from (3), and letting   R−1 i denote the set of coalitions C ⊂ n \i with R − 1 
members, { s it *  } i=1 n is given by the n equations
(4)    ∑ C∈  R−1  
  ( ∏ j∈C   [ 1 − Φ( θ j  [ s j * − 1])])( ∏ j≠1, j∉C   Φ ( θ j [ s j * − 1]))      _____  ∑ C∈  R−1    ( ∏ j∈C   [ 1 − Φ( θ j  s j * )])( ∏ j≠1, j∉C   Φ ( θ j  s j * ))  
 ×  ϕ( θ it [  s it * − 1])  __ ϕ( θ it  s it *)  =  
 π it  _ 
1 −  π it   
1 −  ρ t  _ ρ t   .
The cutpoints { s it * } completely characterize equilibrium behavior. Therefore we 
can write the likelihood of the justices’ votes in case t in the strategic voting case as
(5) Pr ( v t ) ≡  ∑  ω t  
 




 [ 1 − Φ( θ it [ s it * −  ω t ]) ]  v it  Φ( θ it [ s it * −  ω t ] ) 1− v it  .
12 The proof of this result follows Duggan and Martinelli (2001) and is included in the online Appendix 
for convenience.
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The likelihood functions for the expressive and the strategic models (equations (2), 
(5)) are identical, except for the cutoff points:  s it exp for the expressive model, and  s it *
for the strategic model. In principle, uniqueness of equilibrium is not guaranteed 
here, as any set of cutpoints satisfying equation (4) for the strategic model (equa-
tion (1) for the expressive model) constitute an equilibrium. The validity of our 
empirical results below do not require a unique equilibrium, only that the same 
equilibrium is being played within the data sample, so that the data can be pooled, 
as we have done, to estimate the model parameters.13
III. Data
Our data derive from two sources. The first is a database of votes and case-specific 
information from the Original United States Supreme Court Judicial database 
(Spaeth 2008). The second is a database of justice specific information from the 
United States Supreme Court Justice database (Epstein et al. 2010).
The first database begins with the first term of the Warren Court (1953), continues 
through the Burger and Rehnquist courts, and finishes with the 2008 term of the 
Roberts Court. For our purposes, it will be useful to distinguish periods in which 
the composition of the court remains unchanged (this is called a natural court in the 
literature). Given changes in the composition of the court, this creates a number of 
natural courts per chief justice. As we will explain later, we will focus on decisions 
in which nine justices vote.14 This restricts the list of natural courts in our sample to 
those with nine members. Table A1 (in the Appendix) presents the lists of all such 
natural courts, together with the number of cases per court and issue.
We distinguish between four classes of issues: Criminal (includes Criminal 
Procedure), Basic Rights (includes Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, 
Privacy, and Judicial Power), Economic (includes Economic Activity, Unions, and 
Attorneys) and federal (includes Federalism, Interstate Relations, and Federal 
Taxation).15 We refer to the appellant and respondent at the Supreme Court level 
as Plaintiff and Defendant and code the type of Plaintiff and Defendant as one of 
three classes: US Government (includes the US government itself, federal agencies, 
and Congress), Local Government (state governments, local governments, boards of 
education, and state courts) and Private Party (individuals, employees, businesses, 
nonprofit organizations, politicians, aliens, and sovereigns). We code the type of law 
under consideration as one of three classes: Judicial Review (judicial review at the 
national level), Statutory Interpretation (statutory construction at the national level), 
and Others (includes judicial review at the state level, supreme court supervision of 
lower federal courts, interpretation of administrative regulation or rule or executive 
13 This is the same assumption that is required in the recent empirical literature on estimating dynamic games 
(e.g., Bajari, Benkard, and Levin 2007). Another set of papers have explicitly allowed for different equilibria to 
be manifested in different observations of the dataset, resulting in only partial identification of model parameters 
(e.g., Ciliberto and Tamer’s 2009 analysis of airline entry games). It would be challenging to implement such an 
approach in our voting model, because there is already one case-specific unobservable (the state  ω t ). If, in addition, 
the equilibrium played were also assumed to vary across cases, there would be two case-specific unobservables, 
which would raise some tricky identification issues.
14 We include all such cases except memorandum cases and decrees, as well as those in which the court has 
original jurisdiction. Each observation in our dataset is a case (rather than the issue, or issues, being considered).
15 A fifth residual category groups Miscellaneous cases (Spaeth’s issues 980–99).
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order, interpretation of state laws, and federal common law). We also include infor-
mation about whether lower courts agreed on a decision.
The second database provides us with information about each justice. We include 
political party affiliation at time of nomination, prior judicial experience, and the 
years of experience in the court at the time of the decision. We also include the Segal-
Cover (SC) score of the nominee’s ideology and qualifications.16 Table A2 (in the 
Appendix) summarizes this information for each justice in our data.
IV. Estimation: Description and Identification
In this section, we describe the estimation and identification of our model. Clearly, 
identification of our voting model from vote data alone is challenging: as Londregan 
(1999), among others, has noted, from binary data on votes it is difficult to recover 
estimates of the continuous preference distributions of voters, without additional 
modeling and/or parametric restrictions. In our model, these additional restrictions 
come in the form of the parametric restrictions on voters’ preferences and the infor-
mation structure, detailed in Section II. Here, we present an argument as to the 
identification of these model parameters from the observed vote data. We start with 
a more intuitive discussion of identification, by relating the structural parameters to 
be estimated to observed quantities in the data. We then proceed to a more formal 
statistical discussion of identification.
At an intuitive level, the key for identification is that the common value induces 
a correlation of votes in equilibrium: all justices tend to receive larger signals when 
the law favors the Plaintiff, and all justices tend to receive smaller signals when the 
law favors the Defendant. Suppose first that cases are homogeneous, so that justices’ 
types and prior beliefs are invariant across cases. If justices’ quality of information 
were large relative to their bias, and the prior relatively uninformative (say  π i ≈ 1/2 
for all i and ρ ≈ 1/2), the court would “flip-flop’’ evenly between unanimous pro-
defendant and proplaintiff decisions. Now suppose that instead ρ ≈ 2⁄3. Since in 
this case the law favors the Plaintiff more frequently, justices will tend to receive 
large signals more frequently (moreover, to compensate for the larger prior, justices 
will also use strategies that are more favorable for the Plaintiff). As a result, the 
majority of the court would rule for the Plaintiff more often than before. Therefore, 
the frequency in which the majority decision favors the Plaintiff tracks ρ: a larger 
frequency corresponds to a larger estimated prior ρ.17 Suppose next that we change 
the bias of one justice i in our previous example so that her bias is large relative to 
the quality of her information. Then while all other justices will alternate between 
sometimes finding for the Plaintiff and sometimes for the Defendant, i will stay 
put in one decision. This illustrates that low variability in individual decisions cor-
responds to large bias. Finally, return to the previous example in which all justices 
are moderate. As we pointed out before, if the quality of information is sufficiently 
high for all justices, then we would expect these to be unanimous votes. But as the 
16 These scores were derived through content analyses of newspaper editorials written between the date of the 
president’s nomination and the date of the Senate’s final action over the nomination (see Segal and Cover 1989; 
Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1990; Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992; and Epstein et al. 2006).
17 Below, we discuss in more detail how to disentangle priors from case selection.
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quality of information of some justices is lower, these justices would disagree with 
the majority more often. Thus, justices with variable voting records who tend to be 
in the minority are associated with a low quality of information.
Now, as it is, this identification scheme may seem unreasonable, because it appears 
to penalize “maverick’’ justices who go against the grain by assigning them a low 
precision parameter. For this reason, in the empirical work, we control for many 
case-specific covariates and take into account inherent differences among justices 
due to ideology, judicial experience, etc. Therefore, justices with low θ ’s are those 
who have attributes that characterize justices who vote erratically, even after taking 
characteristics of the case into account.
A. A more formal Argument
Our formal identification argument has two parts, which will later be mimicked 
for estimation: first, we show that the justices’ priors and their “reduced-form’’ vot-
ing probabilities are identified from the vote data; second, we show that the param-
eters of voters’ preferences and the information structure are identified from the 
reduced-form vote probabilities. For simplicity, we will assume here that all cases 
are homogeneous, in the sense that all the parameters of the model, {( θ i ,  π i ) } i=1 n , as 
well as ρ, are assumed to be identical across all cases. However, these identification 
arguments continue to hold if all the parameters, as well as Pr( v t ), depend on char-
acteristics of case t, which we denote  X t . In our empirical work below, we will con-
trol for case heterogeneity using a rich set of covariates, so that the justice-specific 
parameters  θ it and  π it vary across both justices i and cases t.
first Step.—We introduce the following notation:
Priors:  ρ ≡ Pr ( ω t = 1) Voting Probs.:  γ i,1 ≡ Pr ( v it = 1 |  ω t = 1)
 1 − ρ = Pr ( ω t = 0)    γ i, 0 ≡ Pr ( v it = 1 |  ω t = 0).
Given this notation, the first-step estimation problem (in both the expressive as 
well as the strategic case) is to maximize the following reduced-form likelihood 
function for the votes:
(6)    max    { γ i, 1 , γ i, 0 } i=1 n , ρ Pr ( v t ) = ρ  ∏ i=1 
n
 [ γ i, 1  v it  (1 −  γ i,1 ) 1− v it  ] 




 [ γ i, 0  v it  (1 −  γ i, 0 ) 1− v it  ]
  s.t.  γ i,1 ≥  γ i, 0 , ∀i = 1, … , n.
Conditional on the state  ω t , the individual votes  v it are independent across the jus-
tices i. Thus, the vector of votes  v t follows a multivariate mixture distribution, 
with mixing probability ρ. Identification of the state-specific voting probabilities 
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 { γ i, 1 ,  γ i, 0 } i=1 n and the mixing probability ρ are available in, e.g., Hall and Zhou (2003); 
Hu (2008); Kasahara and Shimotsu (2007); Allman, Matias, and Rhodes (2009).18
Intuitively, the unconditional correlation among justices’ votes is crucial to identi-
fication. If there were only one decision maker, for example, it would not be possible 
to disentangle the independent effects of ideology and information.19 Moreover, the 
inequality  γ i,1 >  γ i, 0 , which is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property, is 
also important: without this assumption, the voting probabilities would be identified 
only up to an arbitrary classification of  ω t . This inequality resolves this classification 
problem by setting  γ i,1 ( γ i, 0 ) equal to the maximum (minimum) of the two identified 
voting probabilities.
The above-cited papers contain constructive identification proofs, which can be 
directly mimicked for estimation. For our purposes, we found it more convenient to 
maximize the likelihood function (6) directly. This constituted the first step of our 
estimation procedure.20
Second Step.—Using the estimates of the two justice-specific vote probabili-
ties   γ i,1 and   γ i, 0 , from the first step, we recover the two structural parameters,  π i 
and  θ i , for each justice i. Recall our earlier assumptions that justice i ’s private infor-
mation is  s it =  ω t + (1/ θ i ) ε it , with  ε it ∼  (0, 1). Then  γ i,1 ≡ 1 − Φ( θ i [ s i * − 1]) 
and  γ i, 0 ≡ (1 − Φ( θ i  s i * )). Solving these equations for  θ i and  s i * given   γ i,1 and   γ i, 0 (and substituting  Φ −1 ( γ i,1 ) = − Φ −1 (1 −  γ i,1 )) gives 21
(7)   θi =  Φ −1 (1 −   γ i, 0 ) −  Φ −1 (1 −   γ i,1 );   si   =   Φ 
−1 (1 −   γ i, 0 )__   Φ −1 (1 −   γ i, 0 ) +  Φ −1 (  γ i,1 ) .
The estimate of   θi , the precision of i ’s information, is given by the difference 
between the conditional probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff when the law 
favors the Plaintiff (ω = 1) and when the law favors the Defendant (ω = 0). This 
implies that precision increases in the probability of correctly ruling for the Plaintiff 
( γ i,1 ), and decreases in  γ i, 0 , the probability of incorrectly ruling against the defen-
dant. This is very intuitive in light of the theoretical model.
The estimate of the equilibrium cutpoint, instead, is a decreasing function of 
the ratio between  Φ −1 (  γ1 ) and  Φ −1 (1 −   γ0 )—the ratio of the probability of voting 
18 Equation (6) also shows that the mixture structure of the likelihood and, hence, the identification argument, would 
be lost if the priors ρ were allowed to be heterogeneous across justices. This explains the poor results we obtained from 
an alternative specification in which justices have heterogeneous priors (see footnote 11 above). Intuitively, without 
the mixture structure, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of a variable on a justice’s priors versus his probability of 
voting for the plaintiff. This suggests that successful estimation of this alternative model may require a larger dataset 
of cases, with substantial variation in covariates which could be plausibly excluded from judge’s priors but affect vot-
ing probabilities. The SCOTUS may not fit the bill, due to the justices’ relatively small caseloads.
19 Specifically, for the n = 9 justices on the US Supreme Court, the vote vector  v t can take  2 9 values; with a large 
enough dataset, it is possible to estimate the probability that  v t takes each of these values by the empirical frequency. 
On the other hand, there are only 19 parameters (18 vote probabilities, and ρ ) to estimate. Since  2 9 >> 19, the 
relevant necessary condition for identification is satisfied.
20 For the strategic model, there may be multiple equilibria, corresponding to multiple solutions of cutpoints 
( s 1 *, … ,  s n *) satisfying equation (5), for a given set of parameters ( ρ,  θ i ,  π i ). For the purpose of our empirical work, 
we assume only that the same equilibrium is being played across all cases, so that the voting probabilities ( γ i,1 ,  γ i, 2 ) 
can be well estimated by pooling across all cases.
21 For each justice, we use the estimates of  γ i, 0 ,  γ i,1 to recover the two quantities  θ i and  s i . For this reason, 
we consider a one-parameter specification of the information structure; with additional parameters, we might not 
have identification.
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correctly in favor of the Plaintiff ( γ 1 ) relative to the probability of correctly voting 
in favor of the Defendant (1 −  γ 0 ). When this ratio is large, for instance—indicating 
a bias towards the Plaintiff—the cutpoint   s will be small, implying that the justice 
requires a low informational threshold to vote in favor of the Plaintiff.
To recover the bias parameter  π i , we use the equilibrium voting condition, which 
differs between the expressive and strategic models. For the expressive voting 
model, this is
(8)  ϕ( θ i [  si − 1])  _ϕ( θ i   si )  =  
  π i exp  _ 
1 −   π i exp   
1 −   ρ _  ρ  ,
while in the strategic voting model (with majority rule R) this is given by
(9) [ 1 − Φ( θ i [  si − 1])  __ 1 − Φ( θ i   si )  ] R−1  [ Φ( θ i [  si − 1])  __Φ( θ i   si )  ] n−R  ϕ( θ i [   si − 1])  __ϕ( θ i   si )  
 =    π i *  _ 
1 −   π i *   
1 −   ρ _  ρ  .
For both models, plugging our estimates of  θ i and   si into the appropriate equilibrium 
condition allows us to recover estimates of   π i exp and   π i * for the expressive and strate-
gic models, respectively.
Note that, in recovering  θ i , it was not necessary to specify whether justices vote 
expressively or strategically. An assumption regarding strategic or expressive voting 
is required only for recovering  π i . This distinction between  θ i and  π i is a remarkable 
property of this problem. It implies that the precision estimate is independent of 
whether justices care about the court’s decision or about their own vote being cor-
rect, and therefore of whether justices use the information contained in the event of 
their being pivotal or simply best respond to their own private information.
B. Estimation: Accommodating Case and Justice heterogeneity
For convenience, our foregoing discussion of identification assumed that all cases 
are homogeneous. Our actual empirical model accommodates case-level heteroge-
neity by allowing the reduced-form parameters of the model, which are recovered in 
the first step of the estimation procedure, to depend flexibly on observable charac-
teristics of the cases  X t and the justices,  Z i . Specifically, we parameterize justices’ 
priors in case t,  ρ t ≡ Pr ( ω t = 1), as a logit probability depending on case charac-
teristics  X t :
 ρ( X t ; β ) ≡  exp( X t ′ β )  __  1 + exp( X t ′ β ) ∈ [0, 1].
Once the prior probability  ρ t varies across cases, so will the equilibrium strategies 
s it *  and, hence, so will the justice-specific conditional probabilities of ruling against 
the Defendant  γ it,1 and  γ it, 0 . Because of this, the model becomes more difficult. 
One possibility is to undertake “direct’’ estimation where, for each value of the 
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parameters, we need to solve for the equilibrium cutpoints using equations (4) for 
each justice and each case—this is computationally cumbersome. Therefore, we 
propose a procedure that builds on our previous methodology. Since case heteroge-
neity will cause the justice-specific probabilities of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff to 
vary across cases, we parameterize these in the following way, which also restricts 
γ i, t,1 ≥  γ i, t, 0 , for all  X t ,  Z i :
(10)  γ i, 0 ( X t ,  Z i ; ζ, η) =  exp( Z i ′ ζ +  X t ′ η) __   1 + exp( Z i ′ ζ +  X t ′ η) ∈ [0, 1].
  γ i, 1 ( X t ,  Z i ; ζ, η, α, δ) =   γ i, 0 + exp( Z i ′α +  X t ′ δ)   __1 + exp( Z i ′α +  X t ′ δ)  ∈ [  γ i, 0 (ζ, η), 1].
In the first stage, we estimate the parameters (β, δ, η) as well as the justice-specific 
variables ( α i ,  ζ i ) for i = 1, … , n. For this, we maximize the following likelihood 
function:
(11)   max  α, β, ζ, η, δ  ∑ t 
 




 { γ i,1 ( X t ,  Z i ; ζ, η, α, δ )  v it  
 × (1 −  γ i, 1 ( X t ,  Z i ; ζ, η, α, δ) ) 1− v it  }




 {  γ i, 0 ( X t ,  Z i ; ζ, η )  v it  
 × (1 −  γ i, 0 ( X t ,  Z i ; ζ, η) ) 1− v it  }].
For the second stage, we use the predicted values of  γ i, t,1 and  γ i, t, 0 to recover case- 
and justice-specific values of  θ it and  s it *, using the equations in (7). We can then com-
pute the bias estimates solving the n equations (4) for the strategic voting model, 
or (1) (with equality) for the expressive voting model. Note that, when the voting 
probabilities  γ i.0 and  γ i,1 are case specific and depend on the covariates  X t and  Z i , 
then so will the model parameters  θ it and  π it .
disentangling Priors and Endogenous Case Selection.—Up to now, we have 
implicitly assumed that all the cases heard by the court are exogenously chosen; 
i.e., we have not explicitly modeled an agenda-setting stage. However, it is well 
known that case selection can be endogenous, both because the Supreme Court must 
decide (via a vote) whether or not to “grant cert’’ (that is, to hear) a case that has 
been brought to its attention, and also because petitioners and lower courts may 
selectively recommend cases to the Supreme Court for which, given the ideological 
leanings of the justices, the plaintiff has a high probability of winning.22
22 See Cameron, Segal, and Songer (2000), and Daughety and Reinganum (2006) for more information on the 
Supreme Court case selection process.
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In our empirical model, this endogenous case selection is not explicitly accom-
modated and will thus be captured in the parameter ρ describing justices’ common 
prior beliefs about the “right’’ judgment in the cases. To see this intuitively, consider 
the likelihood problem (11). Note that—for given covariates  X t —the parameter 
estimates β in ρ( X t , β) should be set so that ρ( X t , β) is high (low) when justices vote 
more often in favor of (against) the Plaintiff.
This suggests that in general it will be difficult to distinguish a shift in justices’ 
prior beliefs (about randomly assigned cases) from case selection, because both will 
lead, all else equal, to a higher probability of voting in favor of the Plaintiff.
This difficulty in disentangling beliefs and case selection implies that the esti-
mates of ρ |  X t should not be taken out of the context of those courts for which it was 
computed. On the other hand, letting ρ vary in response to the voting data allows us 
to “control’’ for case selection. To capture this we include in  X t both variables that 
capture justices’ priors and case selection. In particular, to capture agenda-setting 
considerations we include chief justice dummies in  X t . Later, we will gauge the 
importance of agenda setting by examining the coefficients on these variables.
V. Results
In this section, we describe our results for the heterogeneous model described 
above. As before, we restrict attention to cases in which all nine justices voted.23 
The covariates are those that were described in Section III. As case-specific covari-
ates, we include characteristics of the Plaintiff and the Defendant (whether Plaintiff 
and Defendant are a Local Government, the Federal Government, or private par-
ties), the authority for decision (whether this is a case that involves the interpreta-
tion of a federal law, a challenge that a federal law is unconstitutional, or others), 
and the disposition of the case by lower courts (whether the lower courts agree). To 
further control for endogenous case selection, we also include the identity of the 
chief justice at the time of consideration of the case (Warren, Burger, Rehnquist, 
or Roberts). To allow maximal flexibility in the order of justices’ bias along dif-
ferent issues, we estimate the model separately for cases involving Basic Rights, 
Economic, Criminal, and Federal issues.24 As justice-specific covariates we include 
the number of years of prior judicial experience, the political party of the president 
that nominated the justice (Democratic or Republican Nominee), and the Segal-
Cover measures of ideology and quality. We also include three variables that vary 
per case and justice: each justice’s years of experience at the court at the time of the 
ruling, and, for each justice i, the average Segal-Cover scores of justices other than 
i sitting in the court that ruled in the case.
Table 1 presents the “first-stage’’ maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) estimates 
of the coefficients of the common prior function ρ( X t ), and of the state-contingent 
23 Note that the equilibrium cutpoint of each justice will be different for each different composition of the voting 
members of the court, implying different conditional probabilities of ruling in favor of the Plaintiff in each state for 
each configuration of voting members, even fixing the covariates  X t . Including only the votes in which all justices 
vote therefore dramatically reduces the number of parameters to be estimated. This still leaves a significant number 
of cases in the sample (see Table A1).
24 The results of carrying out our estimation pooling all votes and introducing “issue’’ as an additional covariate 
are otherwise similar to the issue-by-issue estimation (results are available from the authors upon request).
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probabilities of ruling against the Defendant  γ 0 ( X t ,  Z i ) and  γ 1 ( X t ,  Z i ) for Basic 
Rights and Economic cases. (Table A3 in the Appendix presents the estimates 
for Criminal Procedure and Federalism cases). For all issues other than Federal 
(for which the small sample size leads to uniformly larger standard errors), all 
the coefficients of the case-specific and justice-specific variables are statistically 
significant in the specification of at least one of our first-stage parameters. Either 
the justices’ common prior that the Plaintiff should win the case, or the individual 
Table 1—“First-Stage’’ MLE Estimates: Basic Rights and Economic Cases
Basic rights Economics
ρ γit 0 γit 1 ρ γit 0 γit 1
Constant 0.597 −0.184 7.106 0.341 −0.554 3.051
(0.140) (0.512) (0.543) (0.206) (0.646) (0.930)
Case specific
Plaintiff local government 0.741 −1.420 −0.654 0.930 0.040 −0.599
 (0.133) (0.105) (0.046) (0.272) (0.151) (0.102)
Plaintiff US government 1.002 −0.329 −0.135 0.159 0.510 0.151
(0.177) (0.090) (0.064) (0.180) (0.073) (0.092)
Defendant local government −0.686 0.863 0.379 −0.439 −0.360 −0.011
(0.124) (0.049) (0.072) (0.197) (0.079) (0.114)
Defendant US government −0.823 0.582 −0.469 −0.691 −0.457 −0.456
(0.170) (0.064) (0.074) (0.200) (0.088) (0.094)
Lower courts agree −0.084 0.422 −0.189 0.305 −0.673 −0.081
(0.097) (0.039) (0.039) (0.142) (0.061) (0.068)
Constitutional review −0.137 −0.048 −0.323 −0.062 0.388 1.996
(0.191) (0.080) (0.062) (0.403) (0.142) (0.830)
Statutory interpretation −0.280 0.037 0.343 0.302 −0.889 −0.375
(0.107) (0.045) (0.042) (0.173) (0.066) (0.099)
CJ Burger 0.246 0.126 0.580 −0.329 −0.227 −0.033
(0.122) (0.112) (0.176) (0.177) (0.247) (0.273)
CJ Rehnquist 0.032 −0.139 0.361 −0.502 −0.235 0.758
(0.128) (0.147) (0.193) (0.174) (0.273) (0.316)
CJ Roberts 0.239 0.002 0.501 −0.602 0.357 1.383
(0.288) (0.191) (0.225) (0.348) (0.296) (0.412)
Justice specific
Prior judicial experience 0.012 −0.025 0.014 −0.022
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014)
Democratic nominee 0.382 −0.013 0.124 0.564
(0.089) (0.092) (0.138) (0.148)
SC ideology 0.906 −1.668 0.054 −1.121
(0.128) (0.129) (0.194) (0.202)
SC qualifications 0.375 −1.089 0.082 −0.536
(0.157) (0.181) (0.224) (0.285)
Justice/Case Specific
Average SC ideology of −0.801 1.060 0.058 0.044
 remaining justices (0.304) (0.348) (0.477) (0.593)
Average SC qualifications of −2.953 −5.020 0.013 −0.048
 remaining justices (0.497) (0.612) (0.796) (0.944)
Years of experience in the 0.028 −0.036 0.019 −0.044
 court (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
note: Excluded categories: Plaintiff Private, Defendant Private, Issue Misc., Lower Courts Disagree, Authority 
Other, CJ Warren, Republican Nominee.
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probabilities of ruling correctly and incorrectly in favor of the Plaintiff, are signifi-
cantly different depending on whether the Plaintiff or the Defendant are themselves 
the Federal Government, a Local Government, or a private party, on whether previ-
ous courts agreed on a ruling, etc.
The coefficients on the average SC quality and ideology measures for the other jus-
tices (bolded in Table 1), merit additional discussion. Under simple expressive voting, 
a justice’s vote is not affected by her colleagues, so that the coefficients on these covari-
ates should be zero. Under strategic voting, however, the justices’ votes are interdepen-
dent, and these coefficients should be significantly nonzero. Including the covariates for 
the average Segal-Cover scores for the other justices therefore allows us to informally 
test the strategic versus the expressive voting model. We see that for the basic rights 
and criminal cases, these variables are significant, but not in the other cases; for the two 
largest subsets of the cases, then the strategic voting model seems appropriate.
A. Estimates of Structural Parameters
Given the first-stage coefficients we can compute, for any case t with character-
istics  X t , the common prior  ρ t = ρ( X t ), as well as the conditional probabilities  γ i, t, 0 =  γ 0 ( X t ,  Z i )and  γ i, t,1 =  γ 1 ( X t ,  Z i ) that a justice with characteristics  Z i in case t rules 
against the Defendant in each state of nature. We can then use the predicted values of 
γ i, t,1 and  γ i, t, 0 to recover case and justice specific values of  s it *, and the “deep param-
eters’’  θ it and  π it (for both the strategic and the expressive voting models). In particu-
lar, we can do this for cases with characteristics  X t = x and the actual justices and 
courts observed in the realized history. To describe the main results we will focus for 
the most part on cases of statutory interpretation in which both the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant are private parties, and in which lower courts have agreed on a ruling. We 
refer to this exercise as the benchmark. We then consider comparative statics from 
this initial exercise.25
To reinforce the logic of the model, we begin by presenting the complete set of 
estimates for a single court. Table 2 presents the estimates for Basic Rights and 
Economic cases for the longest-lasting natural court in our data: REHN7, with chief 
justice Rehnquist, between 1994 and 2004. (Table A4 in the Appendix presents the 
corresponding estimates for Criminal Procedure and Federalism.) For each param-
eter, standard errors (computed using the Delta method) are given in parentheses.
For each issue, we indicate the MLE estimate of the common prior probabil-
ity that the law favors the Plaintiff. Thus, in Criminal Procedure the prior is lower 
than in all other issues, and moreover favors the Defendant (ρ = 0.333).26 In all 
other issues the prior favors the Plaintiff and is most favorable to the Plaintiff in 
Economics (ρ = 0.610).
The first two columns present the MLE estimates of the probability that justice i 
rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant ( γ it 0 ) and when the 
law favors the Plaintiff ( γ it1 ). Thus, taking Economics for example, Justice Breyer 
25 We include additional results in an online Appendix.
26 However, it should be noted that most frequently, Criminal Procedure cases have the Government as Plaintiff 
or Defendant (as opposed to here, where we consider both Plaintiff and Defendant to be private parties). When we 
condition for the US Government as Plaintiff, the prior belief that the Plaintiff is right increases to ρ = 0.915 for 
the REHN7 court. We return to this later in the paper.
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had a probability of  γ it1 = 0.94 of correctly ruling for the Plaintiff, and a probabil-
ity of 1 −  γ it 0 = 1 − 0.14 = 0.86 of correctly ruling in favor of the Defendant. 
Column 3 presents the estimate of the informativeness or precision of each justice’s 
signal. As we pointed out earlier, this is an increasing function of the difference 
between the probability that justice i rules in favor of the Plaintiff when the law 
favors the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. The larger precision 
for Breyer relative to Stevens in Economics, for example, reflects both a higher 
probability of ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the Plaintiff (0.94 versus 
Table 2—Estimates. Benchmark Exercise, Rehnquist 1994–2004 Court (REHN7)
Basic rightsa
Justice  γ it0  γ it1 θ  s *  π exp  π * 
Kennedy 0.203 0.852 1.876 0.444 0.517 0.176
(0.012) (0.008) (0.054) (0.016) (0.020) (0.026)
Souter 0.164 0.884 2.175 0.450 0.507 0.176
(0.009) (0.006) (0.044) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027)
Thomas 0.103 0.931 2.743 0.460 0.492 0.175
(0.009) (0.006) (0.070) (0.012) (0.023) (0.027)
O’Connor 0.231 0.849 1.767 0.415 0.500 0.173
(0.016) (0.011) (0.064) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026)
Stevens 0.237 0.847 1.741 0.411 0.499 0.173
(0.015) (0.010) (0.059) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023)
Breyer 0.216 0.870 1.911 0.411 0.485 0.170
(0.019) (0.011) (0.080) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Rehnquist 0.197 0.887 2.064 0.414 0.475 0.168
(0.016) (0.010) (0.075) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024)
Scalia 0.153 0.918 2.415 0.423 0.454 0.161
(0.010) (0.006) (0.055) (0.012) (0.022) (0.024)
Ginsburg 0.326 0.822 1.374 0.329 0.485 0.176
(0.020) (0.011) (0.062) (0.032) (0.020) (0.025)
Economicsb
Justice  γ it0  γ it1 θ  s *  π exp  π * 
Kennedy 0.139 0.859 2.158 0.502 0.612 0.455
(0.013) (0.015) (0.088) (0.020) (0.026) (0.062)
Souter 0.124 0.892 2.390 0.483 0.587 0.448
(0.009) (0.010) (0.070) (0.015) (0.027) (0.061)
Thomas 0.110 0.933 2.725 0.451 0.520 0.411
(0.012) (0.011) (0.110) (0.018) (0.039) (0.066)
O’Connor 0.135 0.840 2.098 0.526 0.637 0.461
(0.012) (0.017) (0.089) (0.021) (0.026) (0.063)
Stevens 0.157 0.822 1.932 0.522 0.630 0.455
(0.013) (0.016) (0.082) (0.021) (0.025) (0.064)
Breyer 0.140 0.934 2.592 0.418 0.473 0.391
(0.017) (0.012) (0.124) (0.022) (0.045) (0.067)
Rehnquist 0.153 0.853 2.075 0.494 0.603 0.452
(0.015) (0.018) (0.106) (0.023) (0.027) (0.060)
Scalia 0.128 0.904 2.438 0.465 0.560 0.436
(0.010) (0.009) (0.073) (0.015) (0.028) (0.061)
Ginsburg 0.146 0.898 2.326 0.454 0.549 0.433
(0.017) (0.015) (0.115) (0.022) (0.032) (0.063)
a Prior ρ mean = 0.566, standard error = 0.031
b Prior ρ mean = 0.610, standard error = 0.037
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0.82) and a smaller probability of ruling for the Plaintiff when the law favors the 
Defendant (0.14 vs 0.16).
The fourth column presents the equilibrium cutpoint. Thus, taking again 
Economics for example, Justice Breyer would vote for the Plaintiff after observing 
a signal  s i ≥ 0.42, but it would take more evidence (a signal above 0.48) for Justice 
Souter to rule in favor of the Plaintiff, and even more for Justice Stevens to vote 
in the same way (a signal above 0.52). This results from three factors. The first is 
the precision of private information. According to the estimates, Breyer has a more 
precise signal than Souter, who in turn has a more precise signal than Stevens. Thus, 
the same evidence has different value for different justices. The second factor is 
the common prior ρ, which as we mentioned in this case “stacks the deck’’ in favor 
of the Plaintiff. The third is the bias of the justice in question (and in the strategic 
voting model, also of the remaining justices in the court, through their equilibrium 
strategy  s −i * ). The justices’ bias are shown in columns 5 and 6 in the table. Here 
Justice Breyer is more moderate ( π BRE exp = 0.47) than Justice Souter ( π SOU exp = 0.58). 
Justice Stevens requires more evidence (a belief of at least 0.63 that the law favors 
the Plaintiff) to rule in favor of the Plaintiff in this class of cases.
The fifth and sixth columns in Table 2 contain the estimates of justices’ bias 
for, respectively, the expressive and strategic voting model. Recall that, in terms 
of the model presented above, π < 0.5 (> 0.5) represents a bias favoring the 
Plaintiff (defendant). However, in interpreting the results, the labels of “plaintiff’’ 
or “defendant’’ are not inherently meaningful; in our model, π is entirely a function 
of particular characteristics of the Plaintiff or Defendant, as well as of the case and 
the justice, so that π essentially captures the strength of the justice’s preferences 
regarding these factors. To illustrate this point, in Table 3 we show how the esti-
mated π’s for the REHN7 justices vary as values of the case and justice covariates 
are changed. We consider five scenarios, corresponding to five different configura-
tions of covariates.
Consider Justice Scalia. In Scenario A we fix all case and justice covariates 
at their REHN7 averages (the average characteristics of cases considered by 
the REHN7 court, and the average characteristics of the justices composing the 
REHN7 court). In this scenario Scalia—along with all other REHN7 justices—
has a bias π = 0.65. In Scenario B, we recompute justices’ bias using the spe-
cific values of each justice’s covariates, and Scalia’s bias changes slightly, to 
0.63. In Scenario C, we fix all case covariates at specific values, corresponding 
to those used in Table 2. In this case Justice Scalia’s estimated bias π falls drasti-
cally, to 0.45: changing values of the covariates has shifted Scalia from “favoring 
the defendant’’ (in Scenario B) to “favoring the plaintiff’’ (in Scenario C). This 
change is reinforced in Scenarios D and E, in which we change the Plaintiff’s type 
(in D) and Defendant’s type (in E) to the US government. We see that Scalia’s bias 
rises substantially in Scenario D and decreases just as much in Scenario E. This 
example illustrates how the plaintiff/defendant labels are not inherently useful for 
interpreting π ; rather, π reflects the justices’ underlying preferences and attitudes 
towards different types of plaintiffs and defendants in certain types of cases. In 
our example, Justice Scalia is clearly skeptical towards the government side in 
basic rights cases involving statutory interpretation, in which also lower courts’ 
dispositions coincided.
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B. The Value of Information in the Court
Given these estimates, we can compute our measure of the value of information 
in the court, FLEX. This is the probability that justice i votes differently than what 
she would have voted for in the absence of her private case information. To compute 
this, we first calculate how each justice would have voted with no private informa-
tion. From (1), this is simply  v it = 1 if ρ ≥  π i and  v it = 0 otherwise (vote for the 
Plaintiff if the public information, as summarized by ρ, outweighs the private bias  π i ). 
Then we compare this initial leaning to the probability of voting differently after 
observing her private information; i.e., FLEX measures the probability that a jus-
tice would “change her mind’’ after observing her private information (vote for the 
Defendant even when ρ ≥  π i , or for the Plaintiff even when ρ <  π i ):
(12) fLEXi = { ρΦ( θ i [  s i * − 1]) + (1 − ρ)Φ( θ i  s i * )  if ρ ≥  π i   ρ[1 − Φ( θ i [ s i * − 1])] + (1 − ρ)[1 − Φ( θ i  s i * )] if ρ <  π i .
Note that FLEX is bounded between zero and one, and takes a value of zero for 
individuals with extremely large biases either for the Plaintiff (π → 0) or for the 
Defendant (π → 1). Note also that the computation of FLEX for the expressive and 
strategic voting models differs only in whether we use  π i exp or  π i * to evaluate whether ρ ≥  π i or ρ ≤  π i . The reason for this is that the equilibrium cutpoint  s i * that is recov-
ered from the data is not determined by whether we use the expressive or strategic 
voting models. Together with the data, the two models imply the same  s i * and  θ i and 
differ only in the biases  π i that rationalize these quantities. As a result, in practical 
terms this means that the expressive and strategic FLEX scores for any given justice 
and any given realization of the covariates  X t are very often identical.27
27 If instead we were initially given values of {  π i ,  θ i } and ρ, then the two models would imply a different equi-
librium cutpoint  s i *  , and FLEX scores in the two models would differ significantly.
Table 3—Bias (π exp ) as a Function of Justice- and Case-Specific Covariates. 
(An Example: Rehnquist 1994–2004 Court (REhn7), Basic Rights)
Justice
SCENARIO A





















Rehnquist 0.65 0.64 0.47 0.77 0.27
Stevens 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.78 0.29
O’Connor 0.65 0.65 0.50 0.78 0.29
Scalia 0.65 0.63 0.45 0.76 0.26
Kennedy 0.65 0.67 0.52 0.79 0.30
Souter 0.65 0.67 0.51 0.79 0.29
Thomas 0.65 0.67 0.49 0.79 0.28
Ginsburg 0.65 0.62 0.49 0.76 0.28
Breyer 0.65 0.64 0.48 0.77 0.28
Prior (ρ) 0.62 0.62 0.57 0.78 0.36
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Table 4 contains the average FLEX scores for each justice across different courts 
for Basic Rights and Economic Cases. (Table A5 in the Appendix presents the scores 
for Criminal Procedure and Federalism.) From a casual perusal of the FLEX scores, 
we see that justices tend to follow their initial leanings: FLEX scores are typically 
below 1/2, and thus, more often than not, justices’ votes reflect their initial consid-
eration of the case, based on bias and prior alone. Having said this, FLEX scores 
are relatively large: on average, the probability of voting differently than what they 
would have voted for in the absence of case information is about 44 percent.
Average FLEX scores display a significant variation across justices. The bottom 
five average FLEX scores in our sample are between 36 percent and 39 percent, 
and the top five average FLEX scores in our sample are between 48 percent and 
53 percent. Two of the justices with the highest average FLEX scores—Warren 
and Rehnquist—were chief justices. (Chief Justice Burger is also among the high-
est FLEX scores; Chief Justice Roberts, on the other hand, is in the bottom half 
of the distribution.) A third, Justice Hugo Black, was a very influential advocate 
of textualism (a legal philosophy restricting heavily the flexibility in the interpretation 
of the law). A fourth justice in this top class is Justice Whittaker, who served for a 




Basic rights (ρ = 0.58) Economics (ρ = 0.66)
Average 
(all issues)
 π exp θ  FLEX exp  π exp θ  FLEX exp  FLEX exp 
Burton 1952 0.29 2.55 0.38 0.75 1.96 0.63 0.53
Black 1954 0.40 1.65 0.35 0.73 1.66 0.58 0.49
Warren 1962 0.37 2.14 0.38 0.78 1.84 0.59 0.49
Rehnquist 1979 0.52 2.44 0.43 0.61 2.33 0.47 0.48
Whittaker 1960 0.37 2.41 0.40 0.76 2.04 0.63 0.48
Frankfurter 1951 0.33 1.65 0.31 0.73 1.73 0.63 0.47
Burger 1978 0.50 2.44 0.38 0.70 2.00 0.57 0.47
Blackmun 1982 0.52 2.17 0.43 0.65 2.06 0.51 0.47
O’Connor 1994 0.54 1.97 0.45 0.61 2.28 0.49 0.47
Reed 1948 0.32 1.66 0.30 0.73 1.74 0.63 0.47
Harlan 1963 0.41 1.99 0.38 0.78 1.74 0.57 0.47
Douglas 1957 0.38 1.49 0.32 0.73 1.57 0.59 0.47
Stevens 1992 0.54 1.95 0.43 0.60 2.09 0.48 0.46
Stewart 1970 0.45 1.82 0.38 0.77 1.63 0.54 0.46
White 1978 0.45 1.98 0.40 0.61 2.23 0.40 0.45
Clark 1958 0.30 2.57 0.38 0.65 2.34 0.30 0.45
Thomas 2000 0.51 2.72 0.41 0.43 2.74 0.37 0.45
Scalia 1997 0.49 2.53 0.41 0.49 2.58 0.38 0.45
Souter 1999 0.53 2.20 0.43 0.51 2.46 0.39 0.44
Kennedy 1998 0.55 1.95 0.45 0.54 2.27 0.42 0.44
Fortas 1967 0.37 1.71 0.35 0.74 2.01 0.64 0.44
Marshall 1979 0.52 1.15 0.40 0.68 1.87 0.57 0.43
Powell 1980 0.47 2.27 0.38 0.57 2.50 0.37 0.42
Roberts 2007 0.45 2.69 0.37 0.29 2.80 0.36 0.41
Alito 2007 0.47 2.56 0.37 0.30 2.64 0.36 0.40
Brennan 1974 0.46 1.16 0.35 0.72 1.66 0.57 0.40
Jackson 1948 0.33 1.45 0.28 0.75 1.70 0.61 0.39
Breyer 2001 0.50 1.79 0.38 0.35 2.48 0.35 0.39
Minton 1953 0.29 2.16 0.34 0.69 2.14 0.33 0.37
Goldberg 1964 0.28 2.10 0.33 0.70 2.21 0.33 0.37
Ginsburg 2001 0.51 1.31 0.37 0.45 2.30 0.37 0.36
Average 0.43 2.02 0.38 0.63 2.12 0.48 0.44
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relatively short period of time (from 1957 to 1962) and was considered a “swing 
vote’’ on a closely divided Supreme Court. This is also the case of Justice O’Connor, 
who also has a relatively high average FLEX score (the highest among justices 
appointed after 1987).
Tables 4 and A5 also illustrate a substantial variation of FLEX scores between 
issue areas. This is consistent with the literature and a cursory glance at the raw 
data, both of which suggest that we should expect the bias and quality of informa-
tion to vary greatly across different issues. Most notably, the typical FLEX score 
in Basic Rights cases (38 percent) is substantially lower than in all other areas, 
which is consistent with the notion that the value of information in the court is lower 
in areas in which ideological considerations tend to weigh more heavily—such as 
Basic Rights.28
Politicization of nominations.—We mentioned above that three of the four chief 
justices in our sample (Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist) have relatively high FLEX 
scores (all three of them are in the top seven scores). The exception is Chief Justice 
Roberts, who was appointed in 2005. Roberts’ relatively low score obtains even if 
he has a relatively high quality of information in most issues. Is this a reflection of a 
wider change in the type of justice appointed to the Supreme Court?
According to many observers, the defeat of Robert Bork’s nomination to the 
Supreme Court in 1987 marked a significant change in how nominations are con-
sidered in the Senate. Epstein et al. (2006) summarize this, noting that “[a] near-
universal consensus exists that the nomination of Robert Bork in 1987 triggered a 
new regime in the Senate’s voting over presidential nominees—a regime that deem-
phasizes ethics, competence, and integrity, and stresses instead politics, philosophy 
and ideology.’’ Their own analysis of the confirmation decisions of US senators con-
firms this conventional wisdom. They argue, however, that while the importance of 
ideology has reached new heights since Bork’s nomination, the Senate’s emphasis 
on this factor began earlier, in the 1950s.
Figure 1 complements this analysis by illustrating the variation in the bias, preci-
sion of information, and FLEX scores of Supreme Court justices throughout time.
The results in Figure 1 partially confirm these arguments. For economics and feder-
alism cases, FLEX scores have, indeed, fallen about 40 percent from the Warren to the 
Roberts courts. For the other two types of cases (basic rights and criminal), however, 
we see a marked decrease in FLEX only during the Rehnquist and Roberts courts: this 
decrease was about 16 percent in criminal cases, and around 20 percent in basic rights 
cases. Thus, our results suggest that the increased politicization of the Supreme Court 
appointment process has become uniformly marked only in the last quarter-century, 
following the failed nomination of justice Bork (i.e., within the Rehnquist and Roberts 
courts). Indeed, Justice Stevens, who has served since the Ford presidency, is seen by 
some as the last link to an era “before the Reagan years, when confirmations became 
28 The table shows a relatively large average bias in favor of the Plaintiff in Criminal cases. It should be noted, 
though, that most criminal cases do not have a private Plaintiff pitted against a private Defendant as we are main-
taining here for consistency of the comparison. Instead most cases involve either the Federal or a Local Government 
facing a private party. As we will show below, the distinction turns out to be important, since having the Federal 
Government as Plaintiff increases the bias in Criminal cases by around 0.7 (see Figure 2). Note that even with this 
clarification, Criminal cases show a larger overall bias for one of the sides in the dispute.
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contested territory in the culture wars.’’29 Moreover, for basic rights and criminal cases, 
FLEX during the current Roberts court is at the same level as in the Warren Court, so 
that for these two types of cases, the recent decrease in FLEX reversed a trend towards 
greater value of information in the court which began in the Burger courts.
C. further Results and Specification Checks
Agenda Setting.—As we mentioned before, the parameter ρ describing justices’ 
common prior beliefs will capture both justices’ prior beliefs about randomly 
assigned cases and changes due to endogenous case selection. With this in mind, 
we included the identify of the chief justice as an additional covariate, thus captur-
ing one important component of agenda setting: the chief justice’s influence on the 
cases that are taken up by the Supreme Court.
Figure 2 shows the difference between the prior ρ in each issue area in the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts courts and the Warren court (for the benchmark exercise). 
If there were no case selection, we would expect these differences to be zero. This 
is not the case. Table 1 shows that the coefficients for the chief justice dummies 
are significant. Figure 2 shows that the this agenda-setting effect is not negligible, 
in particular within Economics, where it ranges from a 7 percent difference (in the 
Burger court) to a 14 percent difference (in the Roberts court).
Communication.—In our formal model, as well as in our empirical exercise, 
we assumed that justices’ private signals are independent conditional on the state. 
29 See Jeffrey Toobin, “After Stevens,” in The new yorker, cover article (March 22, 2010).
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This rules out the possibility of transmission of information through communica-
tion prior to the vote. In the court, however, justices have many opportunities to 
exchange information about each case. The question here is whether justices, as 
strategic agents who care about the collective decision, will use prevote deliberation 
to communicate information to their peers, or whether they will use these arguments 
to try to influence their opinion, possibly not revealing some information that can 
be harmful to their case, or exaggerating evidence one way or the other. While the 
incentive to do so is small when interests are well aligned (Coughlan 2000), this is 
not the case when there is (interim) disagreement, as in the setting considered here. 
This makes truthful revelation of information more difficult, as is illustrated in the 
analysis of Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005), and Austen-Smith and Feddersen 
(2006). (See also Li, Rosen, and Suen 2001; and Doraszelski, Gerardi, and Squintani 
2003.) Here we take an empirical perspective on the issue. To consider the possibil-
ity of informative prevote deliberation in the US Supreme Court, we contrast voting 
records with the empirical implications of the model assuming that justices do in 
fact share their private information with one another.
A first, informal test, is to look at unanimous votes: if pooling of private informa-
tion is strong enough to overwhelm private biases, all justices should vote in the 
same way, and thus all (or most) votes should be unanimous.30 This is not, how-
ever, what we observe in the data: more than 72 percent of the rulings in Criminal 
issues are decided by nonunanimous votes. Similarly, 60 percent of the rulings in 
30 An alternative rationale to focus on unanimous votes follows from the analysis of Gerardi and Yariv (2007). 
If agents send not only relevant information, but also other (random) messages, which the group uses to define 
correlated voting strategies (here unanimous votes), the set of equilibria expands dramatically. Gerardi and Yariv 
(2007) show (using in fact unanimous votes at the voting stage) that every outcome that can be implemented with 
a nonunanimous voting rule r can also be implemented (as a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of the 
voting game) with a nonunanimous rule r ′.
Figure 2. Agenda-Setting Power
Basic rights Economics Criminal procedure Federalism
Burger 0.06 −0.07 −0.05 0.00
Rehnquist 0.01 −0.11 −0.09 −0.06
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Basic Rights, 58 percent of the rulings in Economics, and 56 percent of the rul-
ings in Federal issues are decided by nonunanimous votes. Moreover, the propor-
tion of cases decided by a small majority (say either a 5–4 vote or a 6–3 vote) is 
47 percent in Criminal issues, 37 percent in Basic Rights, 34 percent in Economics, 
and 28 percent in Federalism. Thus, while a nontrivial number of cases are decided 
unanimously, this occurrence is far from prevalent.
Using unanimous votes only to gauge the effect of prevote deliberation on out-
comes is not entirely satisfactory, as it doesn’t allow the possibility that after all the 
information is transmitted, some justices still disagree. We consider this in turn. 
Suppose that, contrary to our benchmark model, justices pool their private informa-
tion through deliberation. Formally, this is equivalent to a model where all justices 
observe the same public signal prior to their vote. This model has testable implica-
tions: in particular, if in a case t with characteristics  X t justice i votes for the Plaintiff 
and justice j ≠ i votes for the Defendant, this reveals that, given  X t , justice i is more 
biased than justice j towards the Plaintiff. Now consider a second case t′ with the 
same characteristics,  X  t ′  =  X t , so that the biases of justices i and j are the same in 
case t′ as in case t. These two justices (i) can vote as they did in t, or (ii) can both 
vote for the Plaintiff (if they observed a strong public signal in favor of the Plaintiff) 
or (iii) can both vote for the Defendant (if they observed a strong public signal in 
favor of the Defendant). However, it cannot be that justice i votes for the Defendant 
and justice j ≠ i votes for the Plaintiff, as this would imply that justice i is more 
biased than justice j towards the defendant, which contradicts her vote in case t.
Hence, observations of such “pairwise flip-flops’’ would violate the model of full 
information transmission in pre-vote deliberation, and we search for pairwise viola-
tions of this kind. In order to rule out variation that is not related to case-specific 
information, we consider sets of similar cases (six in all) and fix the composition of 
the court. To have as many observations as possible, we consider REHN7 (Rehnquist 
1994–2004), the natural court with most observations in our sample. The results are 
presented in Table 5.
With nine justices in the court, there are 72 = n × (n − 1) pairs. Most classes of 
cases present a significant number of violations. Consider the first class of cases (pri-
vate Defendant versus private Plaintiff, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation). 
For the 41 Basic Rights cases in this class, we find 68 pairwise violations among the 
72 pairings. Similarly, there are 44 violations in Economics, 24 in Criminal cases, 
and 56 in Federalism cases. The remaining classes of cases highlight a similar result. 
All in all, the large number of violations present strong evidence against the hypoth-
esis of substantial sharing of information through deliberation.31
does Bias Capture Political Ideology?—Throughout this paper, we used the ter-
minology “bias’’ to denote the parameters  π it , describing justice i ’s propensity to 
31 A second institutional consideration related to communication is that in contrast with our model—in which 
we assumed that voting takes place simultaneously—justices vote in sequence, with the chief justice voting first, 
followed by the associate justices in order of seniority. This could potentially have an effect in terms of transmission 
of information. The question is more subtle than it seems at first sight because, as argued in Dekel and Piccione 
(2000), observing the sequence of votes might not offer any additional useful information if voters condition on the 
event of being pivotal, as in the strategic voting model. In our case, however, justices are heterogeneous, so observ-
ing the voting sequence might still reveal useful information. We leave this interesting aspect for future research.
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rule for the Plaintiff in case t: the size of the hurdle that information in favor of the 
Plaintiff has to overcome to lead to a decision in favor of the Plaintiff. Is this bias 
related at all to political ideology, along the conventional “liberal/conservative’’ 
spectrum? To check this, we also estimated a model where we included variables 
describing whether the Plaintiff’s position in each case is classified as a “liberal’’ or 
“conservative’’ cause. Because under this hypothesis Democratic and Republican 
justices would be expected to respond differently when voting for the Plaintiff is a 
liberal vote, we included an interaction term for these variables.
Figure 3 plots the estimated bias of each justice when the Plaintiff’s position 
is a liberal cause (in the horizontal axis) and when the Plaintiff’s position is a 
conservative cause (in the vertical axis). The figure reports results for the Basic 
Rights and Economics cases, where ideological concerns can be expected to play 
a more prominent role.
The filled squares illustrate the bias of Republican justices in Economics. The 
fact that these points are below the 45 degree line indicates that within Economic 
cases, Republican justices are more inclined to rule in favor of the Defendant when 
voting for the Defendant is a conservative vote. In particular, the average bias of 
Republican justices in Economics changes from 0.42 (moderately in favor of the 
Plaintiff) when voting for the Plaintiff is a conservative vote to 0.62 (moderately in 
favor of the Defendant) when supporting the Defendant is a conservative vote. In 
contrast, Democratic justices’ bias in Economic cases is basically unaffected by this 
distinction. In Basic Rights cases, instead, all justices appear to be more inclined to 
Table 5—Prevote Deliberation 
Basic rights Economics Criminal Federalism
Private plaintiff versus private defendant, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation
No. of cases 41 31 5 10
No. of violations 68 44 24 56
US gov. plaintiff versus private defendant, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation
No. of cases 12 2 1 9
No. of violations 30 12 — 16
Private plaintiff versus US government defendant, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation
No. of cases 9 13 34 3
No. of violations 48 38 70 0
Local gov. plaintiff versus private defendant, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation
No. of cases 12 2 4 2
No. of violations 4 0 0 0
Private plaintiff versus local government defendant, lower courts agree, statutory interpretation
No. of cases 12 4 10 6
No. of violations 12 0 2 0
Private plaintiff versus private defendant, lower courts don’t agree, statutory interpretation
No. of cases 44 46 1 5
No. of violations 70 60 — 0
notes: First entry in each cell is the number of cases in each subsample, and bottom entry 
is the number if pairs of justices for which “flip-flopping’’ (as discussed in Section VC) 
is observed in each subsample of cases. Note that, among the nine Supreme Court justices, the 
maximum number of pairwise violations is 9 × 8 = 72.
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rule in favor of the Plaintiff when voting for the Plaintiff is a liberal vote. This effect 
is marginally stronger for Democratic justices.
These results suggest that while in our model bias can reflect a variety of sources, 
it also partly incorporates the issues associated with political ideology along the 
conventional “liberal/conservative’’ spectrum, especially within economics cases. 
We leave a further exploration of this connection for future research.
D. mistakes and Implications for Institutional design
In any given case, the court must arrive at a single ruling. The court being a col-
lective body, this single ruling requires aggregating the individual opinions in one 
way or the other. The Supreme Court aggregates the individual votes of its members 
by simple majority rule. In this section we address two questions. First, we provide 
a measure of performance: what is the probability that the court reaches a deci-
sion that is contrary to the true meaning of the law? Second, we ask whether this 
performance would improve or decline if the court were to use a different mech-
anism for aggregating the votes of individual justices. In particular, we compare 
the performance of the court with a counterfactual scenario in which ruling against 
the Defendant requires the unanimous consent of the justices.
We begin by computing the probability of mistakes in the court. Note that for any 
given case characteristics X, our first-stage estimates provide the individual probabili-
ties of ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff (1 −  γ i,1 ), and for the 
Plaintiff when the law favors the Defendant, ( γ i, 0 ). (We drop the obvious dependence 
on X to simplify notation.) For a simple majority rule, we then use these individual 
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Bias and political ideology
Dems - Basic rights
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Figure 3. Bias (Expressive Voting model) per Justice, in Economics and Basic Rights Issues. Voting for the 
Plaintiff is a Liberal (Conservative) Vote in the Horizontal (Vertical) Axis
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Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff, Pr (v = d | ω = 1), and for the Plaintiff 
when the law favors the Defendant, Pr (v = p | ω = 0).32 Given a prior ρ, we can then 
compute the total probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court as
  β SC = ρ Pr (v = d | ω = 1) + (1 − ρ) Pr (v = p | ω = 0).
The upper panel of Figure 4 shows  β SC and Pr (v = p | ω = 0) for Basic Rights 
issues, for both the strategic and expressive voting models. (As before, for exposi-
tion purposes here we focus on private parties, lower courts agree, statutory interpre-
tation.) The figure shows two distinct patterns of mistakes throughout the sample. 
In the Warren courts and the first Burger court in the sample (BURG2) the total 
probability of error  β SC fluctuates between 2 percent and 6 percent and exceeds 
10 percent in some natural courts (WAR1, WAR3, WAR8, WAR9). In the remain-
ing Burger courts and in the Rehnquist and Roberts courts,  β SC is bounded below 
2 percent. The error rate is driven by the probability of ruling incorrectly in favor of 
the Plaintiff (bars in the figure). This exceeds 10 percent for several Warren courts 
and is bounded below 4 percent from BURG4 on.
How do these compare with performance under a unanimity rule? To evaluate 
this, we need to compute the probability of mistakes under unanimity. Now, in the 
expressive voting model, this is straightforward. Here behavior is unaffected by 
the aggregation mechanism, and therefore so are the individual strategy cutpoints 
and conditional probabilities. The only change is in the aggregation rule. Here the 
probability of the court ruling for the Defendant when the law favors the Plaintiff is 
1 −  ∏ i=1 9 ( 1 −  γ i,1 ) and the probability of the court ruling for the Plaintiff when the 
law favors the Defendant is  ∏ i=1 9  γ i, 0 . Thus, the total probability of an incorrect ruling 
for the Supreme Court under unanimity rule in the expressive voting model is  β exp U 








   γ i, 0 ].
In the strategic voting model, the computation of the total probability of mistakes 
under unanimity rule requires an additional step because the aggregation mecha-
nism now clearly affects equilibrium behavior. Thus, we cannot use the conditional 
probabilities of ruling for the Defendant recovered from justices’ votes, but rather 
we must recompute the behavioral probabilities that are consistent with equilibrium 
behavior under unanimity. Fortunately, this is not difficult to do given our previous 
results. Given our estimates {( π i * , θ i )} we can use equation (4) with R to compute the 
equilibrium strategy cutpoints  s i ** consistent with unanimity rule. Given  s ** , we can 
then compute  γ i,1 ** = 1 − Φ( θ i [ s i ** − 1]) and  γ i, 0 ** = 1 − Φ( θ i s i ** ). Then the total 
probability of an incorrect ruling for the Supreme Court under unanimity rule in the 
strategic voting model  β * U is








   γ i, 0 **].
32 Letting (k) denote the set of coalitions with exactly k members, Pr (v = d | ω = 1) 
=  ∑ k=5 9  ∑ C∈(k)     ∏ i∈C   ( 1 −  γ i, 1 ) ∏ i∉C    γ i, 1 , and Pr(v = p | ω = 0) =  ∑ k=5 9  ∑ C∈(k)    ∏ i∈C    γ i, 0  ∏ i∉C   (1 −  γ i, 0 ). 
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The lower panel of Figure 4 puts everything together (again, for Basic Rights 
issues). Unanimity rule considerably increases total error rates in comparison to 
simple majority rule. Consider first the expressive voting model. While here jus-
tices do not change their voting behavior in response to the voting rule, unanimity 
requires the vote of all nine justices to reach a decision in favor of the Plaintiff. 
As a result, unanimity reduces the probability of ruling incorrectly in favor of the 
Plaintiff to insignificant levels but increases considerably the probability of ruling 
incorrectly in favor of the Defendant and leads to a large total probability of error 
(including, and especially in, the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts courts). In the stra-
tegic voting model, instead, the change in justices’ voting strategy in response to the 
alternative decision rule leads to an increase in the probability of ruling incorrectly 
in favor of the Plaintiff vis-à-vis majority rule, and with it to an increase in the total 
probability of error, especially in the Warren courts.
This basic conclusion holds across all issue areas (results are available from the 
authors upon request). The results confirm in this application with small commit-
tees and heterogeneous agents the asymptotic results of Feddersen and Pesendorfer 
(1998); and Duggan and Martinelli (2001). (See also Meirowitz 2002.)
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented results from a voting model for the US Supreme 
Court in which votes reflect both justices’ personal ideologies as well as their 
endeavor to “get it right’’: to rule according to an accurate and faithful interpretation 
of the law as it applies to the specifics of each case. In this context, we study whether 
case information has enough power to overturn the prior biases and ideological con-
siderations of the justices.
To tackle this question, we introduce a new estimation approach that allows us to 
handle our model of voting with common values and strategic agents. The model 
is estimated in two steps. In the first step, using the observed votes, we estimate a 
“reduced-form’’ model of justices’ probabilities of voting in favor of the Plaintiff 
when the law favors the Plaintiff and when the law favors the Defendant. In the sec-
ond step, we recover the structural parameters characterizing justices’ preferences 
and information services, using the equilibrium conditions in the voting model.
Our methodology allows us to disentangle the effects of ideology and information 
for each justice, and then to quantify the tradeoffs between ideology and informa-
tion in the court. Our results, as encapsulated in our FLEX measure, indicate a 
substantial value of information: in roughly 44 percent of cases, justices’ initial 
leanings—which reflect their priors or their ideological biases—are changed by 
the case-specific private information of the justices. Moreover, the temporal evolu-
tion of FLEX scores suggest that the increased politicization of the Supreme Court 
appointment process pointed out by the literature has become uniformly marked 
only in the last quarter century, following the failed nomination of justice Bork (i.e., 
within the Rehnquist and Roberts courts).
We close with a remark about the limitations of our results. Possibly the most 
important of these is that our analysis paints a necessarily incomplete picture of 
the court. In this paper, we have concentrated exclusively on the collective deci-
sion about the disposition of the case but abstracted away from a second important 
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dimension of the justices’ rulings: the opinions written by the court. Because of 
the principle of stare decisis, lower court judges must follow the precedents set by 
the Supreme Court, which are mainly embodied in the opinions written by the jus-
tices to justify their votes; these opinions establish the legal rules for lower courts 
and are therefore particularly important in terms of the long-run implications of the 
court rulings, as well as their written justification.
Clearly our estimates of justices’ bias ( π it ), ability to infer the meaning of the 
law ( θ it ), and of the value of information in the court (fLEX) reflect only the voting 
decisions of the justices and do not speak about the determinants of the opinions, 
or their implications. On the other hand, it is important to clarify that the majority 
disposition of a case does not require a majority opinion (i.e., the majority for dis-
position may disagree about the rule that should cover this class of cases); indeed, 
it is not rare to observe justices voting with the majority who nevertheless issue a 
separate opinion expounding their differential interpretation of the law underlying 
the case. Thus, in our eyes, votes and opinions are really two different instruments 
for achieving the two different goals of disposition and precedence setting. Because 
these two goals can be quite independent, we believe that modeling the justices’ vot-
ing behavior apart from their opinion writing, while incomplete, suffices to allow us 
to measure the value of information and perform the various counterfactuals in the 
paper. Moreover, fully modeling the opinion-writing process, and the assigning of 
justices to write them, is very complex.33 We plan to return to this in future research.
Appendix: Additional Tables
33 For more details on the distinction between case disposition and rule creation see Cameron and Kornhauser 
(2008), where case disposition and rule creation are linked because of the assumption that justices care about the 














Harlan 1955–1971 1 R 0.519 0.488 0.481 0.577 0.875–0.750
Black 1937–1971 0 D 0.679 0.655 0.707 0.542 0.875–0.156
Douglas 1939–1975 0 D 0.694 0.630 0.748 0.500 0.730–0.813
Stewart 1959–1981 4 R 0.637 0.585 0.630 0.613 0.750–1.000
Marshall 1967–1991 4 D 0.533 0.564 0.548 0.559 1.000–0.835
Brennan 1957–1990 4 D 0.584 0.630 0.627 0.558 1.000–1.000
White 1962–1993 0 D 0.644 0.651 0.621 0.649 0.500–0.500
Warren 1954–1969 0 R 0.710 0.680 0.802 0.601 0.750–0.855
Clark 1949–1967 0 D 0.553 0.648 0.448 0.549 0.500–0.125
Frankfurter 1939–1962 0 I 0.577 0.529 0.526 0.547 0.665–0.965 
Whittaker 1957–1962 3 R 0.547 0.503 0.525 0.564 0.500–1.000
Burton 1945–1958 0 R 0.512 0.569 0.432 0.485 0.280–0.930
Reed 1938–1957 0 D 0.453 0.588 0.313 0.450 0.725–0.875
Fortas 1965–1969 0 D 0.749 0.691 0.838 0.591 1.000–1.000
Goldberg 1962–1965 0 D 0.772 0.780 0.813 0.683 0.750–0.915
Minton 1949–1956 8 D 0.472 0.516 0.375 0.467 0.720–0.355
Jackson 1941–1954 0 D 0.500 0.571 0.400 0.600 1.000–0.915
Burger 1969–1986 13 R 0.668 0.626 0.646 0.623 0.115–0.960
Blackmun 1970–1994 11 R 0.593 0.574 0.659 0.608 0.115–0.970
(Continued)













Powell 1972–1987 0 D 0.654 0.635 0.688 0.607 0.165–1.000
Rehnquist 1972–1986 0 R 0.633 0.601 0.592 0.575 0.045–0.885
Stevens 1975– 5 R 0.551 0.554 0.593 0.504 0.250–0.960
O’Connor 1981–2006 0 R 0.612 0.619 0.640 0.549 0.415–1.000 
Scalia 1986– 4 R 0.580 0.582 0.588 0.593 0.000–1.000
Kennedy 1988– 13 R 0.593 0.619 0.616 0.612 0.365–0.890
Souter 1990– 7 R 0.559 0.625 0.675 0.590 0.325–0.765
Thomas 1991– 1 R 0.578 0.612 0.565 0.598 0.156–0.415
Ginsburg 1993– 13 D 0.547 0.584 0.634 0.554 0.680–1.000
Breyer 1994– 14 D 0.617 0.664 0.651 0.540 0.475–0.545
Roberts 2005– 2 R 0.662 0.717 0.603 0.500 0.117–0.970
Alito 2006– 16 R 0.627 0.690 0.518 0.400 0.100–0.970
Table A1—Case Data (continued)







WAR1 1953 16 28 10 5 59
WAR3 1954–56 37 34 14 10 95
WAR4 1956 11 6 8 5 30
WAR5 1956–58 61 41 42 13 157
WAR6 1958–61 142 114 78 42 376
WAR8 1962–64 167 100 75 41 383
WAR9 1965–66 107 46 54 17 224
WAR10 1967–68 80 22 63 5 170
BURG2 1969–70 65 20 28 4 117
BURG4 1971–75 254 86 121 24 485
BURG6 1975–80 346 144 149 35 674
BURG7 1981–85 306 148 168 43 665
REHN1 1986 58 28 39 15 140
REHN3 1987–89 141 69 85 30 325
REHN4 1990 38 31 28 5 102
REHN5 1991–92 88 48 52 20 208
REHN6 1992–93 37 24 25 5 91
REHN7 1994–04 416 168 232 75 891
ROBT1 2005 10 4 7 2 23
ROBT2 2005–08 67 42 56 10 175
Total 2,447 1,203 1,334 406 5,390
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Table A3—“First-Stage’’ MLE Estimates: Criminal Procedure and Federalism 
Criminal procedure Federalism
ρ γit0 γit1 ρ γit0 γit1
Constant 0.341 −1.627 6.171 0.045 −0.404 0.733
(0.386) (0.604) (0.821) (0.399) (1.264) (1.515)
Case specific
 Plaintiff local government 2.901 −4.398 −0.790 −0.626 0.495 0.437
(0.424) (0.494) (0.185) (0.386) (0.134) (0.275)
Plaintiff US government 3.077 −2.530 −0.495 0.133 0.667 −0.133
(0.460) (0.272) (0.189) (0.312) (0.140) (0.160)
Defendant local government −0.814 0.698 1.004 0.459 −0.302 −0.302
(0.379) (0.120) (0.186) (0.333) (0.175) (0.171)
Defendant US government −0.397 0.388 0.246 −0.630 −0.759 −1.196
(0.371) (0.117) (0.229) (0.341) (0.147) (0.170)
Lower courts agree −0.206 0.002 −0.081 0.451 −0.251 0.210
(0.174) (0.053) (0.056) (0.241) (0.109) (0.129)
Constitutional review −0.725 −0.312 0.095 0.594 −0.113 −0.004
(0.292) (0.081) (0.097) (0.617) (0.220) (0.306)
Statutory interpretation −0.441 −0.367 −0.018 0.043 −0.339 0.280
(0.209) (0.063) (0.070) (0.349) (0.131) (0.184)
CJ Burger −0.208 −1.327 0.538 −0.013 0.308 −0.168
(0.196) (0.228) (0.202) (0.303) (0.613) (0.785)
CJ Rehnquist −0.388 −1.411 0.542 −0.257 0.228 −0.329
(0.198) (0.265) (0.230) (0.309) (0.669) (0.880)
CJ Roberts −0.044 −1.515 0.742 −0.211 0.770 −0.115
(0.406) (0.286) (0.257) (0.796) (0.741) (1.196)
Justice specific
Prior judicial experience 0.056 −0.056 −0.028 0.058
(0.009) (0.011) (0.018) (0.026)
Democratic nominee 0.498 −0.179 −0.142 0.291
(0.104) (0.137) (0.219) (0.238)
SC ideology 1.838 −2.638 −0.100 0.427
(0.170) (0.192) (0.358) (0.400)
SC qualifications 1.529 −1.267 −0.343 0.840
(0.177) (0.267) (0.465) (0.444)
Justice/case specific
Average SC ideology of −3.265 1.284 −0.922 −0.810
 remaining justices (0.457) (0.438) (1.046) (1.433)
Average SC qualifications 0.448 −2.646 0.134 0.599
 of remaining justices (0.707) (0.802) (1.749) (2.029)
Years of experience in the court 0.041 −0.052 0.000 −0.024
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012)
notes: Excluded categories: Plaintiff Private, Defendant Private, Issue Misc., Lower Courts Disagree, Authority 
Other, CJ Warren, Republican Nominee.
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Table A4—Estimates. Benchmark Exercise, Rehnquist 1994–2004 Court (REHN7) 
Criminal procedurea
Justice  γ it0  γ it1 θ  s *  π exp  π * 
Kennedy 0.323 0.864 1.555 0.295 0.233 0.014
(0.028) (0.022) (0.120) (0.043) (0.030) (0.011)
Souter 0.193 0.908 2.192 0.395 0.232 0.014
(0.019) (0.017) (0.120) (0.027) (0.032) (0.011)
Thomas 0.063 0.964 3.335 0.459 0.240 0.017
(0.009) (0.008) (0.133) (0.019) (0.039) (0.012)
O’Connor 0.289 0.870 1.682 0.331 0.236 0.014
(0.031) (0.023) (0.132) (0.044) (0.032) (0.011)
Stevens 0.310 0.864 1.594 0.312 0.236 0.014
(0.030) (0.023) (0.125) (0.044) (0.030) (0.012)
Breyer 0.333 0.875 1.583 0.273 0.220 0.014
(0.035) (0.024) (0.137) (0.052) (0.033) (0.011)
Rehnquist 0.178 0.916 2.299 0.401 0.228 0.014
(0.023) (0.017) (0.140) (0.030) (0.035) (0.011)
Scalia 0.140 0.946 2.683 0.403 0.198 0.013
(0.017) (0.011) (0.122) (0.022) (0.035) (0.011)
Ginsburg 0.604 0.848 0.764 −0.345 0.234 0.019
(0.034) (0.023) (0.099) (0.140) (0.030) (0.013)
Federalismb
Justice  γ it0  γ it1 θ  s *  π exp  π * 
Kennedy 0.165 0.938 2.513 0.387 0.394 0.070
(0.027) (0.016) (0.173) (0.033) (0.072) (0.044)
Souter 0.196 0.913 2.214 0.387 0.432 0.076
(0.023) (0.014) (0.118) (0.028) (0.053) (0.041)
Thomas 0.245 0.854 1.741 0.396 0.492 0.080
(0.041) (0.027) (0.177) (0.053) (0.050) (0.049)
O’Connor 0.215 0.880 1.966 0.402 0.476 0.080
(0.029) (0.022) (0.148) (0.038) (0.054) (0.044)
Stevens 0.195 0.880 2.037 0.423 0.491 0.081
(0.023) (0.024) (0.145) (0.035) (0.054) (0.047)
Breyer 0.159 0.952 2.666 0.375 0.352 0.062
(0.035) (0.017) (0.236) (0.039) (0.102) (0.042)
Rehnquist 0.221 0.822 1.691 0.454 0.538 0.081
(0.028) (0.039) (0.180) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049)
Scalia 0.195 0.890 2.086 0.412 0.475 0.080
(0.025) (0.020) (0.135) (0.033) (0.053) (0.047)
Ginsburg 0.142 0.966 2.896 0.370 0.309 0.054
(0.028) (0.012) (0.213) (0.032) (0.103) (0.038)
a Prior ρ mean = 0.333, standard error = 0.086
 b Prior ρ mean = 0.570, standard error = 0.069
235IARyCzOWER And ShUm: ThE VALUE Of InfORmATIOn In ThE COURTVOL. 102 nO. 1
REFERENCES
Allman, Elizabeth S., Catherine Matias, and John A. Rhodes. 2009. “Identifiability of Parameters in 
Latent Structure Models with Many Observed Variables.” Annals of Statistics 37(6): 3099–132.
Austen-Smith, David, and Jeffrey S. Banks. 1996. “Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem.” American Political Science Review 90(1): 34–45.
Austen-Smith, David, and Timothy Feddersen. 2005. “Deliberation and Voting Rules.” In Social 
Choice and Strategic decisions: Essays in honor of Jeffrey S. Banks, edited by D. Austen-Smith 
and J. Duggan, 269–316. Studies in Choice and Welfare. New York: Springer.
Austen-Smith, David, and Timothy J. Feddersen. 2006. “Deliberation, Preference Uncertainty, and 
Voting Rules.” American Political Science Review 100(2): 209–17.
Bajari, Patrick, C. Lanier Benkard, and Jonathan Levin. 2007. “Estimating Dynamic Models of 
Imperfect Competition.” Econometrica 75(5): 1331–70.
Cameron, Charles M., and Lewis A. Kornhauser. 2008. “Modeling Collegial Courts (3): Judicial 
Objectives, Opinion Content, Voting and Adjudication Equilibria.” New York University Law and 
Economics Research Working Paper 08–54.
Cameron, Charles M., Jeffrey A. Segal, and Donald Songer. 2000. “Strategic Auditing in a Political 
Hierarchy: An Informational Model of the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions.” American Politi-
cal Science Review 94(1): 101–16.
Ciliberto, Federico, and Elie Tamer. 2009. “Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline Mar-
kets.” Econometrica 77(6): 1791–1828.




Criminal ( ρ = 0.39) Federalism ( ρ = 0.61) Average (all issues)
FLEXexpπexp θ FLEXexp πexp θ FLEXexp
Burton 1952 0.24 2.69 0.51 0.68 2.45 0.59 0.53
Black 1954 0.34 1.37 0.45 0.70 2.24 0.57 0.49
Warren 1962 0.30 1.94 0.48 0.64 2.60 0.49 0.49
Rehnquist 1979 0.25 2.90 0.60 0.56 2.17 0.43 0.48
Whittaker 1960 0.27 2.31 0.49 0.61 2.81 0.39 0.48
Frankfurter 1951 0.28 1.19 0.35 0.65 2.71 0.60 0.47
Burger 1978 0.29 2.63 0.57 0.51 2.88 0.37 0.47
Blackmun 1982 0.26 2.21 0.55 0.50 2.71 0.40 0.47
O’Connor 1994 0.26 2.03 0.54 0.48 2.34 0.40 0.47
Reed 1948 0.28 1.19 0.35 0.65 2.67 0.60 0.47
Harlan 1963 0.33 1.73 0.47 0.63 2.59 0.47 0.47
Douglas 1957 0.30 1.07 0.38 0.67 2.55 0.57 0.47
Stevens 1992 0.26 1.96 0.53 0.49 2.41 0.40 0.46
Stewart 1970 0.32 1.52 0.48 0.59 2.75 0.44 0.46
White 1978 0.29 2.10 0.53 0.59 2.34 0.46 0.45
Clark 1958 0.28 2.85 0.53 0.69 2.32 0.58 0.45
Thomas 2000 0.26 3.34 0.61 0.48 1.99 0.40 0.45
Scalia 1997 0.22 2.89 0.59 0.46 2.40 0.41 0.45
Souter 1999 0.25 2.27 0.55 0.41 2.48 0.39 0.44
Kennedy 1998 0.25 1.71 0.50 0.38 2.79 0.39 0.44
Fortas 1967 0.30 1.21 0.39 0.59 3.01 0.38 0.44
Marshall 1979 0.31 0.72 0.36 0.47 2.83 0.38 0.43
Powell 1980 0.24 2.58 0.56 0.52 2.59 0.38 0.42
Roberts 2007 0.23 3.21 0.55 0.35 2.29 0.36 0.41
Alito 2007 0.24 2.70 0.52 0.28 2.75 0.36 0.40
Brennan 1974 0.31 0.62 0.29 0.53 2.95 0.38 0.40
Jackson 1948 0.30 0.82 0.29 0.61 2.80 0.38 0.39
Breyer 2001 0.26 1.49 0.44 0.32 2.80 0.38 0.39
Minton 1953 0.27 1.84 0.45 0.61 2.86 0.38 0.37
Goldberg 1964 0.25 1.84 0.43 0.61 2.88 0.38 0.37
Ginsburg 2001 0.27 0.74 0.29 0.28 3.07 0.38 0.36
Average 0.27 1.92 0.47 0.53 2.61 0.44 0.44
236 ThE AmERICAn ECOnOmIC REVIEW fEBRUARy 2012
Clinton, Joshua D., Simon Jackman, and Douglas Rivers. 2004. “The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call 
Data.” American Political Science Review 98(2): 355–70.
Clinton, Joshua D., and Adam Meirowitz. 2003. “Integrating Voting Theory and Roll Call Analysis: A 
Framework.” Political Analysis 11: 381–96.
Clinton, Joshua D., and Adam Meirowitz. 2004. “Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legisla-
tures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790.” American Journal of Political Science 48(4): 
675–89.
Coate, Stephen, and Michael Conlin. 2004. “A Group Rule-Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: 
Theory and Evidence.” American Economic Review 94(5): 1476–1504.
Coate, Stephen, Michael Conlin, and Andrea Moro. 2008. “The Performance of Pivotal-Voter Mod-
els in Small-Scale Elections: Evidence from Texas Liquor Referenda.” Journal of Public Econom-
ics 92(3–4): 582–96.
Coughlan, Peter J. 2000. “In Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and 
Strategic Voting.” American Political Science Review 94(2): 375–93.
Daughety, Andrew F., and Jennifer F. Reinganum. 2006.” Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial Dissent 
and Discretionary Review. “In Supreme Court Economic Review Volume 14, edited by F. Parisi, D. 
D. Polsby, and L. R. Cohen, 1–41. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Degan, Arianna, and Antonio Merlo. 2009. “Do Voters Vote Ideologically?” Journal of Economic The-
ory 144(5): 1868–94.
Dekel, Eddie, and Michele Piccione. 2000. “Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elec-
tions.” Journal of Political Economy 108(1): 34–55.
Doraszelski, Ulrich, Dino Gerardi, and Francesco Squintani. 2003. “Communication and Voting with 
Double-Sided Information.” Contributions to Theoretical Economics 3(1): 1–39.
Duggan, John, and Cesar Martinelli. 2001. “A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries.” Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior 37(2): 259–94.
Epstein, Lee, Valerie Hoekstra, Jeffrey Segal, and Harold Spaeth. 1998. “Do Political Preferences Change? 
A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices.” The Journal of Politics 60(3): 801–18.
Epstein, Lee, and Jack Knight. 1997. The Choices Justices make. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Epstein, Lee, René Lindstädt, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland. 2006. “The Changing Dynamics 
of Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees.” The Journal of Politics 68: 296–307.
Epstein, Lee, and Carol Mershon. 1996. “Measuring Political Preferences.” American Journal of Polit-
ical Science 40(1): 261–94.
Epstein, Lee, Thomas G. Walker, Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson, and Jason Roberts. 2010. “The 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database.” Chicago, IL: Northwestern University School of Law. 
http://epstein.usc.edu/research/justicesdata.html. 
Feddersen, Timothy, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1997. “Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation 
in Elections with Private Information.” Econometrica 65(5): 1029–58.
Feddersen, Timothy, and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1998. “Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of 
Unanimous Jury Verdicts under Strategic Voting.” American Political Science Review 92(1): 23–35.
Froeb, Luke M., and Bruce H. Kobayashi. 1996. “Naive, Biased, Yet Bayesian: Can Juries Interpret 
Selectively Produced Evidence?” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12(1): 257–76.
Gely, Rafael, and Pablo T. Spiller. 1990. “A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Deci-
sions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases.” Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organization 6(2): 263–300.
Gerardi, Dino, and Leeat Yariv. 2007. “Deliberative Voting.” Journal of Economic Theory 134(1): 317–38.
Hall, Peter, and Xiao-Hua Zhou. 2003. “Nonparametric Estimation of Component Distributions in a 
Multivariate Mixture.” Annals of Statistics 31: 201–24.
Heckman, James J., and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1997. “Linear Probability Models of the Demand for 
Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators.” RAnd Jour-
nal of Economics 28: S142–89.
Hu, Yingyao. 2008. “Identification and Estimation of Nonlinear Models with Misclassification Error 
Using Instrumental Variables: A General Solution.” Journal of Econometrics 144(1): 27–61.
Iaryczower, Matias, Gabriel Katz, and Sebastian Saiegh. 2009. “Voting in the Bicameral Congress: 
Large Majorities as a Signal of Quality.” Unpublished. 
Iaryczower, Matias, and Matthew Shum. 2012. “The Value of Information in the Court. Get it Right, 
Keep it Tight: Dataset.” American Economic Review. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.1.202.
Kasahara, Hiroyuki, and Katsumi Shimotsu. 2007. “Nonparametric Identification and Estimation of 
Multivariate Mixtures.” Unpublished. 
Kawai, Kei, and Yasutora Watanabe. 2009. “Inferring Strategic Voting.” Unpublished. 
Knight, Brian G., and Chun-Fang Chiang. 2008. “Media Bias and Influence: Evidence from Newspa-
per Endorsements.” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 14445.
237IARyCzOWER And ShUm: ThE VALUE Of InfORmATIOn In ThE COURTVOL. 102 nO. 1
Landes, William M., and Richard A. Posner. 2008. “Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study.” 
Unpublished. 
Lax, Jeffrey R., and Charles M. Cameron. 2007. “Bargaining and Opinion Assignment on the US 
Supreme Court.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23(2): 276–302.
Li, Hao, Sherwin Rosen, and Wing Suen. 2001. “Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees.” 
American Economic Review 91(5): 1478–97.
Lim, Claire. 2008. “Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges.” Unpublished.
Londregan, John. 1999. “Estimating Legislators’ Preferred Points.” Political Analysis 8(1): 35–56.
Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2002. “Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov chain 
Monte Carlo for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999.” Political Analysis 10(2): 134–53.
Martin, Andrew D., and Kevin M. Quinn. 2007. “Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme 
Court.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 23(2): 365–85.
Meirowitz, Adam. 2002. “Informative Voting and Condorcet Jury Theorems with a Continuum of 
Types.” Social Choice and Welfare 19(1): 219–36.
Merlo, Antonio, and Aureo de Paula. 2009. “Identification and Estimation of Preference Distributions 
When Voters Are Ideological.” Unpublished. 
Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. 1985. “A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis.” 
American Journal of Political Science 29: 357–84.
Poole, Keith, and Howard Rosenthal. 1991. “Patterns of Congressional Voting.” American Journal of 
Political Science 35: 228–78.
Segal, Jeffrey, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert Cover. 1990. “Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nomi-
nees: A Neoinstitutional Model.” American Political Science Review 84(2): 525–34.
Segal, Jeffrey, Charles M. Cameron, and Albert Cover. 1992. “A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: 
Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations.” American 
Journal of Political Science 36(1): 96–121.
Segal, Jeffrey, and Albert Cover. 1989. “Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tices.” American Political Science Review 83(2): 557–65.
Segal, Jeffrey, Lee Epstein, Charles Cameron, and Harold Spaeth. 1995. “Ideological Values and the 
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited.” The Journal of Politics 57(3): 812–23.
Segal, Jeffrey, and Harold J. Spaeth. 1993. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal model. Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Spaeth, Harold J. 2008. “The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953–2007 
Terms.” http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/sct.htm/ (accessed May 23, 2009).  
Spiller, Pablo T., and Rafael Gely. 1992. “Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Deter-
minants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–1988.” RAnd Journal of Eco-
nomics 23(4): 463–92.
